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THE LANHAM ACT:*
KEEPING PACE WITH TECHNOLOGY
Marguerite S. Dougherty**
INTRODUCTION
Electronic commerce has exploded in recent years.1 As a result
of the Internet's astounding growth, intellectual property offenses
have been magnified. While patent and copyright issues of
infringement and piracy have arisen from Internet activity,
trademark piracy dominates the Internet cases in the courts.2 The
* The Federal Trademark Act of 1946, commonly referred to as the Lanham
Act, is a unification of Federal trademark law. 1 THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:4, at 5-13 (1998).
The Lanham Act is codified, as amended, at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
- Brooklyn Law School Class of 2001; B.A. Saint Francis College 1996.
The author wishes to thank Professor Leo J. Raskind for his insightful comments
and Professor Claire R. Kelly for her comments as well as the title. This Note
is dedicated to Charles P. Wynne for his encouragement and to John T.
Dougherty for his love and support.
l "E-commerce is expected to generate between $34 billion and $37.5 billion
by 2002 [in Internet sales]." Tina Kelley, Internet Shopping: A Mixed Bag, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 1998, at GI. In 1997 "100 million people logged onto the
Internet, up from 40 million the year before." William M. Daley, U.S. Secretary
of Commerce, Remarks on The Emerging Digital Economy, April 15, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 197997 (F.D.C.H.). "Dell Computers saw 1997 Internet
sales increase ... to daily sales of $6 million several times in December." Id.
2 See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998);
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Gary Scott Int'l v.
Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1997); Telco Communications Group, Inc.
v. An Apple A Day, Inc. 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997); Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Bensusan Restaurant
Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affid on other grounds, 126
F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
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proliferation of Internet trademark offenses surprised both govern-
ment and business.3
Internet technology has engendered a variety of new trademark
offenses including dilution, infringement, unfair competition and
false advertising based upon the appropriation of another's
trademark as a domain name.4 These new offenses also include
3 Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49
S.C. L. REv. 695, 696 (1998). Although, not everyone was surprised by the new
found dominance of trademark offenses. For example, the International
Trademark Association ("INTA"), with membership numbering 3,500, submitted
extensive comments on the Information Infrastructure Task Force ("IITF')
"Green Paper," known as the preliminary report. INTA's comments voiced its
concerns that trademark issues were receiving inadequate consideration from the
Task Force. David Stimpson, President's Report, 53 INTA BULLETIN, No. 11,
June 15, 1998. The IITF was formed in February 1993 "to articulate and
implement the [Clinton] Administration's vision for the National Information
Infrastructure (Nil)." INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTU-
AL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT
OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1 (Sept. 1995).
The NII "as ... discussed in [the] report encompasses digital, interactive
services now available, such as the Intemet, as well as those contemplated for
the future." Id. at 2 n.5. The Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights was
formed "to examine the intellectual property implications of the NII and make
recommendations on... changes to U.S. intellectual property law and policy."
Id. at 2. The HTF's 238-page "White Paper," known as the final report, only
spent six pages on trademark issues. Id. at 168-73. The final report concluded
that in the future, with widespread use of the Intemet, "both the legitimate and
infringing electronic uses of trademarks may increase." Id. at 172 (emphasis
added). The report identified only two possible issues that might arise: domain
name issues and priority use issues. Id. The only recommendation made by the
report regarding trademarks was proposed changes to the International
Classification System to include the "goods and services of modem information
technology" together with the updating by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office's Manual for the Identification of Goods and Services. Id. at
238. The International Schedule of Classes of Goods and Services is a master list
used by almost all countries to classify goods into categories "allow[ing] marks
to be efficiently stored and retrieved according to the class assigned to such
product or service." STEPHEN ELIAS, PATENT, COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK 361
(Lisa Goldoftas ed., 1996).
' A domain name is an address used on the Internet to locate a Web page.
G. BURGESS ALLISON, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET 10 (1995). For
example, www.7online.com will take a user to WABC News Channel 7's local
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trademark appropriation based upon metatagging,5 hyperlinking,6
New York City news station's Web site. The ".com" part of the domain name
is the top level. Id. at 331. It denotes what kind of organization operates the site.
Id. at 331. For example, ".com" denotes commercial use, ".gov" denotes a
governmental entity and ".org" is a non-profit group. Id. The pirating of
another's domain name has been coined "cybersquatting." Intermatic, Inc. v.
Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. Ill. 1996). A "cyberpirate" or
"cybersquatter" is an individual or entity who has registered a domain name
consisting of a valuable trademarked name of another for the purpose of
extorting money in return for the right to use the name as an address on the
Internet. Id. See also Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th
Cir. 1998). Dennis Toeppen is, to date, the most infamous "cybersquatter."
Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1230. He has registered over 200 domain names
including: deltaairlines.com; britishairways.com; eddiebauer.com; and neimen-
marcus.com. Id. See infra Part IIL.A (discussing the Panavision decision).
A more recent case of "cybersquatting" involved defendants who registered
12,000 domain names that they hoped to license to others as Internet e-mail
addresses. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337, 1338 (C.D.
Cal. 1998). The defendants only registered "common proper surnames," such as
Avery and Dennison. Id. The defendants argued that they were not using the
names as trademarks and therefore the Lanham Act did not apply. Id. at 1339.
The defendants also argued that they had registered the names with the ".net"
designation, which still permitted the plaintiff to register its marks with the
".com" designation, as the plaintiff had in fact done. Id. at 1341. The court
disagreed, finding that the ".net" designation had not been limited to Internet
providers as originally planned, and recognized that "many registrants, including
trademark holders, [had] registered domain names with '.net' designations that
are not internet providers." Id. Moreover, the court said that it was "extremely
dubious that licensing domain names [was the] defendants' true business." Id.
The court found, however, that it was unable to hold that as a matter of law the
defendants' business was a sham. Id. at 1342. The court ordered the two domain
names at issue to be relinquished to the plaintiff in exchange for $600. Id. This
was a 300% return on the defendants' initial investment. Id. See also infra note
76 and accompanying text (identifying other domain name cases).
' A "metatag" is a hidden component of an Internet address that is directed
to capture the attention of a search engine so that the address receives more hits
or visits from users. Ian C. Ballon, Linking, Framing and Other Hot Topics in
Internet Law and Litigation, 520 PLI/PAT 167, 246 (1998). Metatagging has been
coined "cyber-stuffing." 3 THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:69, at 25-107 (1998). See also infra note 78 and
accompanying text (identifying metatagging cases).
6 "Hyperlinking" or "linking" is a feature of the Internet that allows a user
to point and click on either a domain name or a symbol, seamlessly allowing the
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
framing7 and keyword triggering.8 These offenses often present
cases of first impression for our courts.9 The nature of the Internet,
and its continually expanding capabilities together with its
unregulated nature, will present greater challenges in trademark law
for years to come.1°
The Lanham Act is the codification of federal trademark law
user to move from one site to another. Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech.,
Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 460 n.6 (D. Mass. 1997). Hyperlinking provides the way
for one to "surf the Web." 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 25:70, at 25-109. See
also infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing linking).
7 "Framing refers to the process whereby one Web-site can be visited while
remaining in a previous Web site." Digital Equip., 960 F. Supp. at 461 n.12.
Framing presents copyright issues as well as trademark infringement and false
advertising issues. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 25:70, at 25-110. See infra note
79 and accompanying text (discussing framing).
8 A "keyword" works in a similar manner to a domain name in that it
produces the same navigational result as a domain name. WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION: INTERIM REPORT OF THE WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN
NAME PROCESS ch. 5, 286 [hereinafter WIPO REPORT]. For example, instead
of entering www.bofa.com to access Bank America Corp., the user would simply
enter "bank of america." Id. ch. 5, 286 n.151. A keyword is also used as a
trigger to initiate a banner advertisement. Robert C. Scheinfeld & Parker H.
Bagley, Using Others' Trademarks to Trigger Internet Advertisements, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 24, 1999, at 3. Trademarks are being sold as keywords which when entered
into a search field of the host search engine, i.e., Yahoo, AltaVista, will trigger
a banner advertisement for another parties' goods or services. Id. Estee Lauder,
Inc. recently filed a lawsuit in the Southern District Court of New York against
both the advertiser and the advertiser host. Id. Estee Lauder alleges that its
trademarks were sold to a competitor to trigger banner advertisements. Id. WIPO,
in its interim report of the domain name process recognized that the use of
keywords may shift the debate from domain names to keywords. WIPO REPORT,
supra, ch. 5, 290.
9 As one court, in deciding whether a preliminary injunction was appropriate
in a metatagging case, recently stated, "[t]his is a classic illustration of a new
kind of litigation for which nothing in past experience comes even close to
preparing trial judges and the advocates appearing before them." Niton Corp. v.
Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998).
10 "No one owns [the Internet]. No single organization controls it." Philip
Elmer-DeWitt, Welcome to Cyberspace: What Is It? Where Is It? And How Do
We Get There?, TIME, March 22, 1995, at 4, 9.
" 15 U.S.C §§ 1051-1127 (1994). The Lanham Act "provides a national
registry for trademarks, generating nationwide protection for registered marks.
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and the primary vehicle for the enforcement of trademark rights of
either registered or unregistered marks. The most significant
threshold issue in the enforcement of trademark rights, in contro-
versies arising from electronic contacts in cyberspace, 2 is that of
personal jurisdiction. Although the Supreme Court has long
recognized that personal jurisdiction exists over a non-resident, 3
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident has
recently been the cause of extensive litigation. 4 Of the recent
personal jurisdiction decisions issued by the federal courts, more
than one-third have centered on trademark cases derived from
Internet use.' 5 As a result, courts have, at least superficially, tried
The statute also provides for enforcement of either registered or unregistered
marks." Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the
Emerging Law of Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 24 (1995).
12 The term "cyberspace" was originally coined by William Gibson in his
1984 science fiction novel Neuromancer. Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 10, at 4. The
terms cyberspace and the Internet are used interchangeably. Elmer-DeWitt, supra
note 10, at 4. Cyberspace "encompasses the millions of personal computers
connected by modems-via the telephone system-to commercial online
services .... local area networks, office E-mail systems and the Internet." Elmer-
DeWitt, supra note 10, at 8.
1" See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334
U.S. 541, 545 (1948)) (opining that the determination that personal jurisdiction
exists over a non-resident is "one in which few answers will be written in black
and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are
innumerable"). The Internet cases, however, are creating all new shades of grey.
Robert W. Hamilton & Gregory A. Castanias, Tangled Web: Personal Jurisdic-
tion and the Internet, 24 No. 2 LMNG. 27, 29 (1998). For a further discussion of
the Supreme Court's recognition of the existence of personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident, see infra Part III.
14 There have almost been more decisions written about personal jurisdiction
in the last three years than in the previous ten. Search of Westlaw, ALLFEDS
(Mar. 29, 1999). There were 139 personal jurisdiction decisions in trademark
cases between 1985 and 1995. Id. Since 1995, there have been 122 personal
jurisdiction decisions in trademark cases. Id. Of the 122 decisions, 49 focused
on personal jurisdiction in trademark cases involving the Internet. Id.
'5 Id. See infra Part II, examining recent decisions in trademark cases where
personal jurisdiction is at issue.
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to fit this new electronic medium into the existing personal
jurisdiction analysis.1 6
Presence on the Internet is electronic, not physical, making the
traditional analysis of contacts inapplicable. The traditional personal
jurisdiction analysis applied in Internet trademark cases has resulted
in a body of law that lacks clarity, consistency and uniformity. This
lack of uniformity undermines the policy of the Lanham Act, which
was drafted to promote national uniformity in trademark law,
simplify registration procedures and foster speedy resolution of
cases. 17 Congress would best serve these goals by enacting an
amendment to the Lanham Act 18 providing for nationwide juris-
diction in controversies arising from electronic use of a mark 9 or
16 See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D.
Mass. 1997) (recognizing that the medium is "anything but traditional," yet
ultimately finding the traditional analysis appropriate to determine personal
jurisdiction).
17 S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946).
18 The Lanham Act provides for jurisdiction "without regard to the amount
in controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity of the citizenship of the
parties." Lanham Act § 39, 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994).
'19 A "'mark' includes any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or
certification mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
A "'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof ... to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including
a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown." Id.
A "service mark" includes "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof ... to identify and distinguish the services of one person,
including a unique service, from the services of others and to indicate the source
of the services, even if that source is unknown." Id.
A "collective mark" is "a trademark or service mark-(1) used by the
members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organiza-
tion ... and includes marks indicating membership in a union, an association,
or other organization." Id.
A "certification mark" includes "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof-(1) used by a person other than its owner . . . to certify
regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or
other characteristics of such person's goods or services or that the work or labor
on the goods and services was performed by members of a union or other
organization." Id.
460
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trade name2 ° on the Internet. Such an amendment would provide
clarity, give all Internet users and operators "fair warning," and
would permit an already over-burdened judicial system to concen-
trate on the new substantive issues presented by trademark piracy,
infringement, false advertising and dilution on the Internet.21
The Note posits that analyzing personal jurisdiction in trade-
mark Internet controversies by using a framework founded on
physical contacts is inappropriate, because its uneven application
to an electronic medium by the courts defeats the national
uniformity policy of the Lanham Act. Part I provides an overview
of the Internet. Part II examines trademark issues arising from
Internet use. Part III examines the existing jurisdictional framework
and the tests derived by the Supreme Court and surveys federal
court decisions applying those tests to trademark issues and the
Internet. Part IV reviews trademark legislative history and the
national uniformity policy of trademark law that has been tested by
court decisions and amended by Congress. Part V proposes a
statutory solution to clarify personal jurisdiction in trademark
controversies arising from the Internet and discusses the benefits
and arguable disadvantages of a statutory enactment. This Note
concludes that the policy of federal trademark law would best be
served by an amendment to the Lanham Act expressly authorizing
nationwide personal jurisdiction in infringement, dilution, unfair
competition and false advertising controversies arising from
electronic contacts on the Internet.
20 "'Trade name' . .. mean[s] any name used by a person to identify his or
her business or vocation." Id.
21 See Evelyn Apgar, Lawyers Decry Federal Judicial-Shopping Bill, N.J.
LAW.: WKLY. NEWSPAPER, June 2, 1997, at 3. David Sellers, a spokesman for
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, stated that because there are over
100 vacancies on the federal bench, judges' time is at a premium. Id. In 1998,
there were 26,787 civil case filings in U.S. District Courts. Today's News,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1999, at 1. Since 1985, the number of judges on the circuit
courts has only been increased by 12 while the appellate case load has increased
by 20,000. William Glaberson, Caseload Forcing Two-Level System For U.S.
Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 1999, at Al.
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I. THE INTERNET
The Internet,22 as the Supreme Court has recognized, is a
unique medium that is difficult to categorize because it is constant-
ly evolving. 3 The Internet has been in existence for nearly thirty
years and has no geographical boundaries.24 As the Eastern
District Court of Pennsylvania succinctly explained, "it is not a
physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which
interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer
networks. It is thus a network of networks. 25 Similarly, the
Supreme Court noted that this "unique and wholly new medium"
enables tens of millions of people to communicate with one another
as "the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be
phenomenal. 26 It has become, as one commentator noted, "an
22 The term Internet was first used by Vincent Cerf in 1974 in a research
paper outlining the common language all computers would use to communicate
with each other. Angela Gunn & Charles Pappas, What a Short, Strange Trip It's
Been ... A Brief Net History, YAHOO! INTERNET LIFE, Sept. 1998, at 72, 74.
The first demonstration of the Internet was held in Washington, D.C. in October
1972, at the Hilton Hotel. Josh McHugh, Robert Kahn, Packet Man, FORBES,
July 7, 1997, at 328-29.
23 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997).
24 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S.
Ct. 2329 (1997); William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real
World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 197, 201
(1995). The Internet began as an experimental military project named ARPARET
by the Advanced Research Project Agency in 1969. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
The military, defense contractors and university laboratories were linked together
by this network. Id. This decentralized network maintained a series of redundant
links between computer networks and computers which were capable of rapidly
transmitting communications. Id. The goal of the system was "to allow vital
research and communications to continue even if portions of the network [were]
damaged... in a war." Id. To that end, ARPARET encouraged multiple linking
between computers and the network. Id. This linking occurred over high-speed
telephone lines. These computers and telephone links formed the basis of what
is now known as the Internet. Byassee, supra, at 201.
25 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 830.
26 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334, 2351. One of the inventors of the Internet,
Robert Kahn, when asked if he was "satisfied with his brainchild," responded
"No. The [Internet] hasn't panned out yet. We're still looking at the tip of the
462
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almost inescapable presence," 27 penetrating some parts of the
world that have yet to have television or postal delivery.28 In fact,
thanks to local humanitarian groups, several villages in West Africa
that lack running water have e-mail access.
29
Generally, the Internet can be accessed through various servers:
at local libraries, storefront "computer coffee shops," schools,
Internet service providers, national commercial online service
providers or through bulletin board systems.3 ° The Internet
permits users to communicate text, data, sound and video in a
variety of ways. The methods of communication include: e-mail;
3
'
iceberg." McHugh, supra note 22, at 329. In 1993, traffic exploded on the
Internet at an annual rate of 341,634%. Gunn & Pappas, supra note 22, at 72,
74. This traffic has frustrated researchers by hindering their ability to quickly
retrieve files over the Internet. Ballon, supra note 5, at 175. Consequently, 112
universities are developing a faster computer network, known as Internet 2,
which will be able to prioritize communications. Ballon, supra note 5, at 175. It
is expected, however, that this new technology will be transferred to the original
Internet. James Lichtenberg, Net2: New High-Speed Network Seeks Publishers'
Input, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Apr. 27, 1998, at 15. An Internet 2 user will be
able to download a 30-volume encyclopedia in less than one second. Id.
27 Matt Richtel & Declan McCullagh, Yes, it Really is a World Wide Web,
YAHOO! INTERNET LIFE, Sept. 1998, at 94. "Turn on a TV set .... [o]pen a
newspaper" and one is confronted with advertisement after advertisement listing
the domain name of the companies' Web sites and encouraging the consumer to
"visit" them online. Id.
21 Id. at 96.
29 Id. In fact, the number of Internet hosts in Africa increased 839% between
1993 and 1996. Global Internet Project, Internet Foundations: Breaking
Technology Bottlenecks (visited Mar. 22, 1999) <http://www.gip.org/gipl0.htm>
[hereinafter GIP].
30 American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 165 (S.D.N.Y.
1997). A "bulletin board service" ("BBS") offers chat forums, allows subscribers
to upload and download data and to post messages. Ballon, supra note 5, at 177.
The first BBS was founded in Chicago in 1978. Gunn & Pappas, supra note 22,
at 73.
31 "E-mail" or electronic mail is mail that may be sent around the world in
a matter of minutes via the Internet. Ballon, supra note 5, at 177. The first e-
mail was sent in 1972. J.D. Biersdorfer, What's the @ in E-Mail?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 1998, at GIl. By the year 2000, the annual volume of e-mail is
predicted to reach six trillion messages. Gunn & Pappas, supra note 22, at 72.
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listserv; 32 Usenet;33  telnet;34  ftp;35 gopher;36 and the World
Wide Web3 7 ("Web"). The Internet links together various servers
around the world,3s and provides a "massive resource of servic-
es." 39 As the Supreme Court noted, "the content on the Internet
is as diverse as human thought."4
The Web, conceived in 1990,41 is "the most well-known
method of communicating information online."4 It is extremely
difficult to estimate the number of users due to the decentralized
nature of the Internet. The number of users linked to the Internet
from 1990 to 1997 grew from one million to 70 million.43 By the
31 "Listserv is an automatic mailing list service that allows efficient
communication on discrete areas of interest." JONATHAN ROSENOER, CYBERLAW:
THE LAW OF THE INTERNET 342 (1997).
33 "Usenet" is a protocol through which a discussion group is operated.
ALLISON, supra note 4, at 336. There are news groups on thousands of topics
from neuroscience to conspiracy. See ALLISON, supra note 4, at 336; Gunn &
Pappas, supra note 22, at 73. Usenet was created by Tom Truscott, Jim Ellis and
Steve Bellovin in 1979 to provide a place for users to talk and argue about an
infinite variety of topics. The Usenet group now number more than 50,000
participants. Gunn & Pappas, supra note 22, at 73.
" "Telnet" is "a way to access and control remote computers on the Internet.
Once connected, your keyboard appears to be directly connected to the remote
computer." ROSENOER, supra note 32, at 343.
" "Ftp," an acronym for File Transfer Protocol, is a protocol that lets "a
user on one computer log onto, review, and transfer files to and from another
host computer over a network." ALLISON, supra note 4, at 333.
36 "Gopher" is "a simple menu-based information service that makes
collections of information available across the Internet." ALLISON, supra note 4,
at 333.
17 "World Wide Web" is a "hypertext-based information service that makes
collections of information available across the Internet." ALLISON, supra note 4,
at 339.
38 ALLISON, supra note 4, at 19.
39 ALLISON, supra note 4, at 19.
40 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2335 (1997).
41 Gunn & Pappas, supra note 22, at 74. The popular rush to the Web did
not begin until 1993 with "the first graphics-friendly" Web browser, Mosaic.
Gunn & Pappas, supra note 22, at 74.
42 American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 166 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
41 GIP, supra note 29. If the United States Internet population was a country,
it would rank twenty-second in the world, placing it in between France and the
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end of 1999, the number is expected to rise to two hundred
million." By 2005, experts project the number of users to reach
one billion.45 As one commentator noted, the Web "has done what
thousands of years of war, peace, love and hate could not: unite
our world.,
46
The Web is made up of millions of Web sites.47 A user can
access a Web site by entering the address of the site, known as a
Uniform Resource Locator or URL.48 The URL consists of the
Internet service and a top level and second level domain name.49
Ukraine. Ron Bel Bruno, The Big Picture, YAHOO! INTERNET LIFE, Sept. 1998,
at 76. The United States Internet population exceeds the population of any state
by almost 20 million. Id.
4 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
4' Tom Mainelli, Billions & Billions Earned, SMART COMPUTING, Oct. 1998,
at 38.
46 Howard L. Steele, Jr., Comment, The Web That Binds Us All: The Future
Legal Environment of the Internet, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 495, 495 (1997).
17 Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-Tags:
An Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA 243, 245 (1998). As of February
1999, there were 4,301,512 Web sites. Robert H. Zakon, Hobbes' Internet
Timeline (visited Mar. 23, 1999)<http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Intemet/-
History/HIT.html>. Each Web site is comprised of multiple pages. Kuester &
Nieves, supra at 245. One of the most popular search engines reports cataloguing
nearly 11 million Web pages. Global Internet Project, The Emergence of a
Networked World, Commerce, Society and the Future of the Internet: How the
Internet Works (visited Mar. 22, 1999) <http://www.gip.org/gip7.htm>. The first
page of a Web site is referred to as the home page. Ballon, supra note 5, at 175.
Web site pages are growing steadily at a rate of 300,000 pages per week. GIP,
supra note 29.
48 ALLISON, supra note 4, at 339. The URL "identifies the specific location
of Internet resources." ALLISON, supra note 4, at 339.
49 ALLISON, supra note 4, at 331, 339. For example, in the address
www.dell.com, "www" informs the computer that the address is on the World
Wide Web, "dell" is a second level domain name for Dell Computer's Web page
and ".com" represents the top level domain for a commercial organization.
ALLISON, supra note 4, at 331, 339. Domain names are the user-friendly version
of Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses, which are numeric and difficult for people
to remember. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 25:72, at 25-114. Domain names
were initially issued on a first come, first served basis. David J. Loundy, A
Primer on Trademark Law and Internet Addresses, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 465, 466 (1997); Management of Internet Names and
Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741-42 (1998). Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI")
465
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under contract with the National Science Foundation coordinates the registry. Id.
at 31,742. NSI performs two functions: (1) screening domain names against its
registry to prevent duplication and (2) maintaining a directory linking domain
names with IP numbers and domain name servers. Id. at 31,742.
This system of registry has become unsatisfactory for three reasons. Id.
First, conflicts have arisen between trademark holders and domain name holders.
Id. Second, there is an absence of competition in domain name registration. Id.
Third, it is inappropriate for United States research agencies to direct registry
functions as commercialization of the Internet continues. Id. Consequently, on
June 10, 1998, the Department of Commerce issued a general statement of
policy, known as the "White Paper," which provides for the United States to
withdraw completely from the domain name system ("DNS") by September 30,
2000. Id. at 31,744. It also provides for "the creation of a new private, not-for-
profit corporation responsible for coordinating specific DNS function for the
benefit of the Internet as a whole" and the expiration of the agreement with NSI.
Id. at 31,744, 31,747. Further, the White Paper summoned WIPO "to develop
recommendations for a uniform approach to resolving trademark/domain name
disputes involving cyberpiracy." Id. at 31,747. WIPO was established by treaty
to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world. WIPO
REPORT, supra note 8. WIPO currently has 171 States of the World as members.
WIPO REPORT, supra note 8. Subsequently, the Department of Commerce issued
an amendment to the White Paper, effective October 7, 1998, which extended the
cooperative agreement until September 30, 2000, and provides for the recognition
by NSI of NewCo as the new not-for-profit corporation described in the White
Paper. Department of Commerce, Special Award Conditions, NCR-9218742,
Amend. No. 11 (Oct. 6, 1998)<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/-
proposals/docnsil00698.htm>. Thereafter, the U.S. Department of Commerce
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") as the new not-for-profit entity
charged with the responsibility of providing a smooth transition of domain name
management to the private sector. Memorandum of Understanding Between the
U.S. Department of Commerce and Internet Corporationfor Assigned Names and
Numbers (visited Mar. 23, 1999) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/-
domainname/icann-memorandum.htm> [hereinafter Memorandum]. The
agreement terminates on Sept. 30, 2000. Id. The agreement provides that the
process must take into account, among other things, the recommendations of
WIPO. Id. WIPO's interim report sets forth procedural and substantive proposals
to address "cybersquatting." Jonathan E. Moskin, Internet Governance System
Evolves, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 15, 1999, at S6. WIPO requested final comments to be
submitted by Mar. 12, 1999. Id. Some proposals by WIPO include the imposition
of a contractual relationship between the domain registrant and the registration
authority, that such agreement contain a clause requiring that the registrant
submit to the jurisdiction of particular courts and submit to alternative dispute
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A user may alternatively search for a site through the use of finders
known as search engines.5°
A user may move seamlessly from one page of a Web site to
another or from one site to another through the use of a
hyperlink.51 A hyperlink may consist of either underlined and
highlighted text or image.52 A user "points and clicks" on a
hyperlink and is immediately transported to the chosen docu-
ment.53 This ability to link is perhaps the most important feature
of the Web. 54 This ability enhances the aura of boundlessness that
surrounds the Web because a user is indifferent to the geographical
location of the other Internet user they are communicating with.55
This geographical indifference is at the center of the difficulty in
analyzing personal jurisdiction.
Web sites may be passive or interactive. A passive site has
been analogized by some courts to an advertisement in a national
resolution on-line, and that exclusions can be obtained to prohibit third parties
from registering a famous mark. WIPO REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 2, 46, 59;
ch. 4, 218.
50 A "search engine" is a service that allows a user to search for sites on the
Web "that contain certain categories of information, or to search for key words."
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997). The engine then lists hyperlinks to transport the user to those sites. Id.
Some popular search engines include: www.yahoo.com; www.hotbot.com; and
www.altavista.net. Matt Lake, Desperately Seeking Susan OR Suzie NOT Sushi,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1998, at G1. Search engines respond to metatags, invisible
components of a Web address that capture the attention of the search engines.
Ballon, supra note 5, at 246.
"1 Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1232 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Walter A. Effros, Withdrawal of the Reference: Rights, Rules, and
Remedies for Unwelcomed Web-Linking, 49 S.C. L. REv. 651, 651 (1998).
" Gwenn M. Kalow, Note, From the Internet to Court: Exercising
Jurisdiction Over World Wide Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2241,
2248 (1997). One commentator, illustrating the geographical confusion that
results from the Web, noted that from his physical location in New Jersey, he
could access the Internet using his California account. Dan L. Burk, Federalism
in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. Rv. 1095, 1113 (1996). Thus, any system that he
accessed would "see" him as being "located" at an Internet domain in California
rather than New Jersey where he was actually, physically located. Id.
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magazine.56 An interactive site allows a user to send messages to,
and receive messages from, the site operator.57 A site may also
enable a user to purchase goods from the site operator. In fact,
some enterprises only transact business online.5 8
Business, slow to recognize the economic opportunities
presented by the Web,59 was not born on the Internet until
1994.60 Now, nearly fifty percent of all small businesses operate
a Web site and seventy-two percent use e-mail to communicate
with customers.61 Web sites are being used by businesses to
advertise products, solicit sales, communicate with and inform
customers, complete actual commercial transactions and as a means
to actually deliver their product. 62 Commentators have suggested
that the recognition by business that "E-commerce will be the
fundamental element of doing business in the next millennium" has
caused a "neo-gold rush" to the Internet.63
Internet technology allows information to be "pulled" or
"pushed."'  "Pulling," the basic technology, requires affirmative
action on the part of the user, analogous to a vending machine,
where a customer makes a selection and causes the selection to be
56 See, e.g., Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
" Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.
Pa. 1997).
58 See, e.g.,www.amazon.com where a user may purchase books and music.
G. Bruce Knecht, Amazon.Com Web Site Gets What Few Others Have: Lots of
Paying Customers, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1996, at Al.
59 Alan N. Sutin, Dilution Act is Powerful Weapon in Internet Domain Name
Disputes, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 1997, at 5.
6 Hamilton & Castanias, supra note 13, at 29. By 1996, the Web had
attracted more than 100,000 retailers; some spent over one million dollars on
their Web site. Knecht, supra note 58, at Al.
6! Bel Bruno, supra note 43, at 77.
62 Hamilton & Castanias, supra note 13, at 29. Software, which can be
purchased and immediately delivered by downloading online from the seller's
computer to the buyer's computer, was the number one good sold in 1997. Bel
Bruno, supra note 43, at 77.
63 Scheinfeld & Bagley, supra note 8, at 3.
6 Ballon, supra note 5, at 180.
468
TRADEMARK INTERNET JURISDICTION
delivered to him.65 "Pushing," on the other hand, allows informa-
tion to be delivered directly to a user without any affirmative
action on the part of the user,66 analogous to television commer-
cials. This push technology has become a profitable marketing tool
employed by business.67 Amazon.com, a bookseller who conducts
its business exclusively on the Web, for example, tracks its
consumers' purchases over the Web and uses the information to
build a personal profile, so that, when the customer returns to
Amazon.com, a selection of books will have been chosen for
browsing based on past purchases.68 As commercial transactions
expand at an exponential rate over the Internet, damage from
intellectual property trespasses are becoming more significant, and
the need for legislation addressing these transactions becomes more
urgent.69
II. TRADEMARK ISSUES ARISING FROM THE INTERNET
The United States government's initial attention on the impact
of the Internet was focused on copyright infringement issues.7"
65 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 21
(1996).
66 Ballon, supra note 5, at 180.
67 Don Clark, Technology: Overcoming the Hurdles, WALL ST. J., June 17,
1996, at R18.
68 Id.
69 Jose I. Rojas, Liability of ISPS, Content Providers and End-Users on the
Internet, 507 PLI/PAT 1009, 1013 (1998).
70 See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF
THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 2 & n.5 (Sept.
1995). In 1993, three years after the birth of the Web but one year prior to the
genesis of commercial business on it, the IITF established the Working Group
on Intellectual Property Rights. Id. The primary focus of IITF's report was
"copyright law and its application and its effectiveness" in the context of digital
interactive services such as the Internet. See also supra note 3 (discussing the
IITF's report). The laws of copyright have always been connected to freedom of
expression and technological advances in dissemination. Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984). Copyright issues were
expected to be prominent on the Internet since the invention of the printing press
gave rise to the original need for copyright protection. Id. at 431 n.12.
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However, all types of intellectual property disputes emanating from
Internet use are now pending. The Web fosters patent, copyright
and trademark uses not contemplated when the statutes protecting
these rights were drafted.
The Internet is raising trademark issues across the United
States; indeed, around the world.7' As global access to electronic
commerce grows, it is apparent that trademark issues will involve
people worldwide.72 This will result from the tension between the
inherent territorial nature of trademark law and the geographical
unbounded expanse of the Internet.
7 3
The Internet's lack of geographical boundaries poses analytical
problems for personal jurisdiction analysis traditionally founded on
physical contacts. 4 Internet use raises traditional and nontradition-
al statutory trademark offenses.75 Controversies sounding in
dilution, infringement, false advertising and unfair competition
based on the appropriation of domain names76 are particularly
71 Molly Buck Richard, Trademark Issues on the Internet, 507 PLI/PAT 657,
665 (1998). Domain name disputes have arisen in England, Germany, the
Netherlands and France. Id. See also Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g,
Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (involving a preliminary injunction
which prohibited the defendant, an Italian publisher, from publishing a magazine
under the name Playmen who was now 15 years later operating and publishing
the same magazine on the Web).
72 Burk, supra note 3, at 731.
73 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §§ 26:1-26:3, at 26-3 to -8 (discussing the
territoriality of trademark law); Byassee, supra note 24, at 198 (discussing that
the Internet is geographically unlimited).
74 See infra Part III, discussing traditional personal jurisdiction framework.
7' For a further discussion of Internet trademark infringement issues that are
outside the scope of this Note, see 3 McCARTHY, supra note 5, §§ 25:68-25:77,
at 25-106 to -147; Sally M. Abel & Marilyn Tiki Dare, Trademark Issues in
Cyberspace: The Brave New Frontier, 488 PLI/PAT 65 (1997); Ian C. Ballon,
The Emerging Law of the Internet, 507 PLI/PAT 1163 (1997).
76 Controversies founded in trademark dilution and infringement based on
domain name use in the past two years alone include: Panavision Int'l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130
F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Desktop Techs., Inc. v. Colorworks Reprod. & Design,
Inc., No. Civ. A. 98-5029, 1999 WL 98572, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1999);
Washington Speakers Bureau v. Leading Auths., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.
Va. 1999); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Feinberg, 26 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
Park Inns Int'l, Inc. v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 762 (D. Ariz.
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prevalent. Similar controversies also arise from appropriations
based upon linking7 7 and framing, 78 as well as metatagging,
79
1998); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337 (C.D. Cal. 1998);
Bunn-O-Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Serv. Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1375 (C.D. Ill.
1998); K.C.P.L., Inc. v. Nash, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1584 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); CFOS 2
GO, Inc. v. CFO 2 GO, Inc., No. C97-4676 SI, 1998 WL 320821, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. June 5, 1998); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int'l, Inc., No. 97-734-A,
1998 WL 724000, at *1 (E.D. Va. April 10, 1998); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue
Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997); Quality Solutions, Inc. v.
Zupanc, 993 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ohio 1997); SF Hotel Co. v. Energy Invs., Inc.,
985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan. 1997); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions,
Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Juno Online Servs., L.P. v. Juno
Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Teletech Customer Care
Management (Cal.), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., Inc., 977 F. Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal.
1997); CD Solutions, Inc. v. Tooker, 965 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Digital
Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997); Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997);
Cardservice Int'l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1997), affd, 129
F.3d 1258 (4th Cir. 1997); Haelan Prods., Inc. v. Beso Biological Research, Inc.,
43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1672 (E.D. La. 1997); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v.
Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998);
Rubbercraft Corp. v. Rubbercraft, Inc., No. CV97-4070-WDK, 1997 WL 835442,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 1997); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620,
1997 WL 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
For a further discussion, see Ira S. Nathenson, Comment, Showdown at the
Domain Name Corral: Property Rights and Personal Jurisdiction Over Squatters,
Poachers and Other Parasites, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 911 (1997) . See also supra
note 4 (discussing domain names).
" Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 460 & n.6
(D. Mass. 1997). See Emily Madoff, Freedom to Link Under Attack, N.Y.L.J.,
June 23, 1997, at S1. See also supra note 6 (for further discussion on hyperlink-
ing).
78 Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 461 &
n.12 (D. Mass. 1997). See also Meeka Jun, Been 'Framed'?: Imposters Beware,
N.Y.L.J., June 20, 1997, at 5; supra note 7 (for further discussion on framing).
" See Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d
102 (D. Mass. 1998); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D.
Cal. 1998), afj'd, 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Calvin
Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997). See also Robert Baron,
Metatags Raise Serious Legal Issues, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 14, 1998, at S4; Ann Davis,
Web Weaves a Tangled Trademark Issue, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1997, at B10;
David P. Miranda, Invisible Infringement on the Internet, IPL NEWSLETTER
(ABA Sec. of Intell. Prop. L.) Summer 1998, at 18; supra note 5 (for further
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keyword triggering, 8° and priority81. The rising volume of litiga-
tion underscores the need for courts to get beyond the jurisdictional
issues and focus on the merits.
The conflict between trademark law and the Internet will get
worse before it gets better.82 Trademark use is growing rapidly.8 3
The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")
estimates that 250,000 trademark applications will be filed in 1998
and 275,000 in 1999.84 A recent count of active domain names
worldwide was 5,222,894.85 According to USPTO figures it is
apparent that even with the issuance of additional top level domain
discussion on metatagging).
8 See Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Fragrance Counter, Inc., No. 99 CV 0382
(S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 19, 1999). See also WIPO REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5,
286; supra note 8 (discussing keywords and triggering).
8 Priority issues involve senior and junior users. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note
5, § 26:1, at 26-3. A senior user is the first seller to adopt and use a mark in the
United States. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26:1, at 26-3. A junior user is the
second seller to adopt the mark. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26:1, at 26-3.
Priority controversies arising from Internet use include: Cybersell, 130 F.3d
414; Park Inns Int'l, 5 F. Supp. 2d 762; CFOS 2 GO, 1998 WL 320821, at *1;
SF Hotel, 985 F. Supp. 1032; Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 983
F. Supp. 1331 (D. Or. 1997); Juno Online Servs., 979 F. Supp. 684; Rubbercraft
Corp., 1997 WL 835442, at *1.
82 Another threat to trademark owners on the Web may be the use of
deliberate typographical errors in domain names by site operators in anticipation
that a percentage of users will make the anticipated error and access the site.
Robert C. Cumbow, 'Typosquatters' Pose Threat to Trademark Owners on the
Web, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 13, 1998, at S2. These could include "amazom.com" for
"amazon.com" or "dismey.com" for "disney.com." Id.
83 Trademark piracy is, in general, growing at a rapid pace also. Youssef M.
Ibrahim, As Trademarks Multiply, Infringement Does, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1998, at C2. The International Trademark Association estimates that business
suffered $2.1 billion in sales losses due to trademark piracy last year alone. Id.
8 Statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property Comm. on the Judiciary (March 19, 1998) <http://www.-
ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/commerce.052/lehm0319.htm>.
85 Statistical information about domain registration is available at the Web
site of NetNames, Ltd. (visited Mar. 22, 1999) <http://www.domainstats.com>;
ALLISON, supra note 4, at 339. A record 1.9 million domain names were
registered in 1998 with NSI. Matt Richtel, New Domain Names Set a Record in
1998, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1999, at G3.
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names," issues of priority will continue to plague trademark
owners. 87 Prompt resolution of these disputes on the merits is
necessary to foster the national uniformity policy of federal
86 In addition to ".com.. ".org" and ".net", it has been proposed that under
the Counsel of Registrars plan, seven new generic top level domain ("gT=D")
names will be added. These include: ".firm" for businesses or firms; ".shop" for
business offering goods to purchase; ".web" for activities related to the Web;
".arts" for cultural and entertainment activities; ".rec" for recreation and
entertainment activities; ".info" for information services; ".nom" for personal
uses. John C. Blattner, Internet Domain Names and Trademark Rights: The
Confusion is Likely to Get Worse Before it Gets Better, 76 MICH. B.J. 1344,
1345 (1997); James M. Jordan III, Master of All Domains?, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20,
1998, at S5; Jonathan E. Moskin, Board the Moving Bus: Trademark Owners
Beware of Proposals to Improve Management of Internet Names and Addresses
(visited Oct. 31, 1998) <http://www.pennie.com/art04l9fr.htm>. However, ".com"
will always be "king" as the business name. Andrew Marlatt, Will New Domains
Spark a Free-For-All, INTERNET WORLD, February 1998, at 15, 16. Of the
5,222,894 domain names registered worldwide as of March 18, 1999, 3,008,941
were ".com." NetNames, Ltd. (visited Mar. 22, 1999) <http://www.-
domainstats.com>.
Senator Leahy commented that the introduction of new gTLDs without
analyzing their impact on trademark rights would be the equivalent of "putting
the cart before the horse." 144 CoNG. REC. S12,155 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Leahy). President Clinton, in an effort to put "the horse back
before the cart," signed a bill authorizing a study to analyze domain name issues.
Next Generation Internet Research Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-305, 112 Stat.
2919. See infra Part IV.C, discussing the Next Generation Internet Act of 1998.
87 For example, "Ritz" is registered as a trademark to 14 owners. Search of
USPTO's Web Trademark Database (Sept. 28, 1998) <http://www.uspto.gov>.
The owners include: John C. 0. Ritzenthaler for cleaning and polishing cloths;
Nabisco for bakery products, snack mix, packages of crackers with cheese spread
and cracker sandwiches; Charles Of The Ritz Group Ltd. for cosmetics and
perfume; Shen Manufacturing Co., Inc. for clothing; Wilson Bottling Corp. for
soft drinks; W.B. Johnson Properties, Inc. for hotel and restaurant services; The
Ritz Hotel Ltd., Paris, France for men's wear; The Ritz Hotel, Ltd., London,
England for sunglasses, watches, tennis rackets, cutlery and furniture; and R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. for cigarettes. Id. There are also 53 registered owners of
a trademark that includes "Ritz" in the mark. Id. There are 334 domain names
registered that include "Ritz" as part of the domain name. Search of Whols
database (Sept. 28, 1998) <http://whois.net>. The domain "ritz.net" is registered
to the Ritz Ballroom in Tennessee; "ritz.org" and "ritz.com" are registered to The
Ritz Hotel, Ltd. in France. Id.
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trademark law. Before courts can reach the merits of these issues,
however, personal jurisdiction must be determined.
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION, TRADEMARK ISSUES AND THE
INTERNET
The framework for the present personal jurisdiction analysis
originated more than half a century ago, at a time when society's
technological advances included the invention of the xerography
process and the first general purpose electronic digital calculator.88
The personal jurisdictional framework evolved into various tests set
forth by the Supreme Court. These jurisdictional tests include the
"minimum contacts,"8 9 "purposeful availment," 9° "stream of
18 See BERNARD GRuN, THE TIMETABLES OF HISTORY 523, 525 (3d ed.
1991); Mainelli, supra note 45, at 35.
89 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant who was not present
in the forum, but who had "certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" was proper). The Court further held that as due process
depended "upon the quality and nature" of the contacts with the forum, the
determination of what constituted "minimum contacts" was fact specific. Id. at
319. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92
(1980) (bifurcating the International Shoe test by characterizing the "minimum
contacts" prong as the threshold inquiry to be met before determining whether
jurisdiction comports with "fair play and substantial justice" and holding that
"foreseeability" alone without sufficient "minimum contacts" was not "a
sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause").
"[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis ... is that the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id. at 297. Unilateral activity
of a third party cannot serve as a basis for jurisdiction over a defendant who
otherwise lacks "minimum contacts." Id. at 298.
90 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (holding that
a defendant may not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of "random,"
"fortuitous," or "attenuated" contacts, but rather must receive "fair warning" that
a particular activity may subject them to the jurisdiction of a foreign forum.
Personal jurisdiction is therefore available if the defendant purposely directed his
activities at residents of the forum.).
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commerce" 9' and "effects, 92 tests. This framework was last
addressed by the Supreme Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court93 in the mid-1980s when Apple's Macintosh
microcomputer with a mouse was launched. 94
In addition to the Supreme Court's tests of personal jurisdiction,
individual states have enacted "long-arm" statutes to "insure state
citizens a local forum in which to litigate causes of action that arise
from the activities of non-residents., 95 Long-arm statutes either
9' Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 110, 112
(1986) (holding that when the sale of a product, other than in an isolated
incident, results "from the efforts of a manufacturer or distributor to serve,
directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States" and such product
is the source of the injury, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant is not unreasonable, but "the placement of a product into the stream
of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum State"). The Justices sharply divided on the interpretation of
the stream of commerce theory. Id. at 116-18 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan joined with three other Justices and opined that the stream of commerce
theory advanced by the plurality was too narrow and propounded that awareness
that a product is being marketed in a foreign state suffices for "minimum
contacts." Id.
92 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984) (holding that for intentional
torts the "effect" of the defendant's conduct on a resident of the forum was a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction because the defendants' conduct was "intentional-
ly calculated to cause injury" to the plaintiff in the forum State). This test has
been simplistically and broadly interpreted by many courts who ignored "the
operative facts in Calder which demonstrate that the defendants' contacts [with
the forum] were not random, but quite substantial." Cynthia L. Counts & C.
Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework for Addressing Liability and
Jurisdictional Issues in this New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1083, 1123 (1996).
The defendants' actions included: calling the forum for sources as part of their
research; focusing their story on events in the forum; aiming their story at a
forum resident whose career was centered in the forum; publishing the story in
their national magazine which had the highest level of distribution in the forum.
Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
9' 480 U.S. 102 (1986).
4 See id.; GRUN, supra note 88, at 609.
9' JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.12, at 139 (2d ed.
1993). See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-4-101 (Michie 1997); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 410.10 (West 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59b (West 1998);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 1996); OR. R. CIV. PROC. 4 (West 1999); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (West 1999).
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limit jurisdictional reach or extend it to the full reach of the
Constitution.96 These statutes are now in effect in all fifty
states.97 The long-arm statutes and the Supreme Court's tests are
now being applied to electronic media by analogy. The Internet,
however, is a technology that cannot be readily analogized to
commerce of tangible goods and physical presence. Consequently,
the decisions of the courts confronted by the interrelation of the
Internet, trademark issues and personal jurisdiction cannot be
synthesized into a coherent body of law. The decisions run the
96 A good example of this premise is found in examining the long-arm
statutes of New York and California. Rule 302 of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules allows for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over any non-
resident who "transacts business within the state or contracts [] to supply goods
or services in the state or commits a tortious act within the state." N.Y. C.P.L.R.
302 (McKinney 1996). It further provides that a non-resident will be subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts of New York State if he
commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to [a] person
within the state ... [and he] regularly does or solicits business, or
engages in any persistent conduct, or derives substantial revenue from
goods or services used ... in the state, or [he should have] reasonably
expect[ed] the act to have consequences in the state and [he] derives
substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; or [he]
-.. possesses any real property [] within the state.
Id. Personal jurisdictional analysis, in New York and states with similar long-arm
statutes, is a two-prong test. See, e.g., American Network, Inc. v. Access
Am./Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (employing the
two-prong analysis). A New York court first examines whether jurisdiction can
be exercised in accordance with N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 and if so, whether the
exercise of jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause under the
minimum contacts analysis set forth in International Shoe. American Network,
975 F. Supp. at 496-500.
A dramatically different approach is taken by California, where "[a] court
of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§410.10 (West 1973). Personal jurisdiction analysis, in California and states with
similar long-arm states, is only a single test. Such courts must only determine
whether personal jurisdiction can be exercised in accordance with due process
using the minimum contacts analysis as set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny. See, e.g., Ameritec Corp. v. Ameritech Corp., 230 U.S.P.Q. 225, 226
(C.D. Cal. 1986).
97 GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL
PROCEDURE §14[A], at 55 n.12 (2d ed. 1994).
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gamut from finding personal jurisdiction based upon a Web site
that was not yet fully operational or based upon a passive Web site,
to personal jurisdiction acquired based upon an interactive Web
site.98 Conversely, other courts have refused to confer personal
jurisdiction in cases where the Web site was either not fully
operational or was passive. 99 Moreover, courts seem more likely
to find the exercise of personal jurisdiction to be proper in cases
where the dispute centers on a trademark that is pirated and used
by someone other than the owner as a domain name. 00
Across the United States, these cases have resulted in splits
among and within the circuits. Most courts apply the tests of
"purposeful availment" or "stream of commerce" singularly or in
combination when analyzing personal jurisdiction.' The founda-
tion of this analysis is based on the premise that an individual
voluntarily establishes a Web site with full knowledge of the
Internet's global reach. 10 2 The infirmity of this premise is that
98 See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (interactive Web site); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (Web site not fully operational); Inset Sys., Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996) (passive Web site).
99 See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997)
(passive Web site); CFOS 2 GO, Inc. v. CFO 2 GO, Inc., No. C 97-4676 SI,
1998 WL 320821, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 1998) (Web site not fully operation-
al); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (Web site not operational); Bensusan Restaurant Corp.
v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (passive Web site), affid on other
grounds, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
'0o Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Extending the Long Arm of Personal
Jurisdiction Over the Net, CoRP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1997, at 34.
" See David M. Kelly & Christina J. Hieber, Untangling a Web of
Minimum Contacts: The Internet and Personal Jurisdiction in Trademark and
Unfair Competition Cases, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 526, 539 (1997). See, e.g.,
Maritz, 947 F. Supp. 1328, Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. 161.
1"2 Kelly & Hieber, supra note 101, at 539. One commentator suggests that
by the very nature of the medium, an individual cannot satisfy the test of
purposeful availment through electronic contacts on the Internet. Jason L.
Brodsky, Civil Procedure-Surfin' the Stream of Commerce: CompuServe v.
Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), 70 TEMP. L. REv. 825 (1997). Others
suggest that a restrictive approach to purposeful availment as articulated by
Justice O'Connor in Asahi, or a variation thereof, is the proper analysis because
it provides a flexible framework for cyberspace contacts by requiring "something
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antithetical conclusions can be reached depending upon the focus
of the analysis.
When the analysis focuses on the Web site owner's mere
knowledge or foreseeability that the Web site can be accessed
globally, jurisdiction will be exercised in all Internet cases.
However, when the focus is "on the Web site owner's intention to
purposefully direct the content of its Web site into the forum state,"
the exercise of jurisdiction is less certain because the analysis will
require additional facts as a manifestation of intent. 103 What
constitutes additional facts manifesting an intent varies from circuit
to circuit, court to court °n Other courts focus on the defendant's
knowledge of the effect his conduct will have on the plaintiff using
the "effects" test.105 This is the root of the inconsistency and
incoherency of the present body of law.
A. The "Effects" Test Focus
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
one of only three appellate trademark Internet decisions, 1°6 as
more" than a passive Web site. See Colleen Reilly, Bensusan Restaurant Corp.
v. King, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 271 (1998); Andrew E. Costa, Comment,
Minimum Contacts in Cyberspace: A Taxonomy of the Case Law, 35 Hous. L.
REV. 453 (1998); David L. Stott, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace:
The Constitutional Boundary of Minimum Contacts Limited to a Web Site, 15 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 819 (1997). See also supra note 91
(discussing the Asahi decision).
103 Kelly & Hieber, supra note 101, at 539. One commentator believes that
"[a] party's conduct is the best indicator of his intention to reach out to a
particular forum... [and courts] need to separate the actor's behavior from the
medium in which it takes place." Costa, supra note 102, at 503.
'04 The analysis that considers additional factors has been characterized by
the courts as "Web site plus" analysis. Seee.g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing,
Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997); Gary Scott Int'l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F.
Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1997).
105 See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.
1998).
'06 See id. The other two court of appeals decisions are Cybersell, Inc. v.
Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997), and CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,
89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). A fourth case, Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,
937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), was affirmed on other grounds by the United
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well as District Courts in the First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits use
the "effects" test in analyzing the question of personal jurisdic-
tion. 10 7 In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the defendant's conduct
manifested his intent to injure the plaintiff in the forum state."°8
The defendant, a "cybersquatter,"' 0 9 registered the plaintiff's
domain name in the hope of extorting money from the plaintiff for
its return." The defendant displayed panoramic photographs of
Pana, Illinois on his Web site."' The court, in focusing on the
defendant's "cybersquatting" conduct, held that the defendant
explicitly directed his activity to the forum state, which he knew
would have the effect of injuring the plaintiff."2 Further, the
court found that the plaintiff would not have suffered harm but for
the defendant's conduct." 3 Thus, the court found the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant was proper.1 4
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
107 See Purco Fleet Servs., Inc. v. Towers, No. 2:98CV786G, 1999 WL
137654, at *1 (D. Utah Mar. 9, 1999); Bunn-O-Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee
Serv., Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1375 (C.D. Il. 1998); Digital Equip. Corp. v.
AltaVista Tech. Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997).
108 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). One commentator has remarked that
application of the holding in Calder to the Internet may "be taking a good joke
too far" because "the structure of the network is such that there is no meaningful
opportunity to avoid contact with a given jurisdiction." Burk, supra note 55, at
1117.
109 See supra note 4. This conduct has also been termed "reverse hijacking."
Howard G. Zaharoff & Thomas W. Evans, Cyberspace and the Internet: Law's
Newest Frontier, BOSTON BAR J., May-June 1997, at 14.
110 Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319. The defendant "offered to settle the
matter" in exchange for $13,000. Id. After the plaintiff refused to pay, the
defendant then registered Panavision's other trademark name "Panaflex." Id. His
Web page simply displayed the word "Hello." Id. The highest reported price paid
for a domain name was $3 million paid by Compaq Computers. Price of a Name,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998, at G3.
... Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319.
112 Id. at 1321.
113 Id.
114 But see No Mayo-San Francisco v. Memminger, No. C-98-1392 PJH.,
1998 WL 544947, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1998) (holding jurisdiction not
proper in spite of allegation that the defendant had offered to sell the domain
name back to plaintiff). See infra Part III.D, discussing No Mayo decision.
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In Digital Equipment Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc., the
District Court of Massachusetts, applying the "effects" test, found
that the defendant "should have anticipated being haled into the
[forum state]" for "allegedly causing trademark infringement that
it [knew would] have ... an especially harmful effect on [the
plaintiff]."' 5 The court chose to focus on the "effect" of the
defendant's conduct to satisfy minimum contacts relegating the fact
that the parties had entered into a licensing agreement to the
background." 6 The licensing agreement gave the defendant the
right to use "Alta Vista" as part of its corporate name and its
domain address, but precluded the defendant from using "Alta
Vista" as "the name of a product or service offering."" 7 The
defendant arguably knew that its Web site violated the licensing
agreement with the plaintiff, as it used "Alta Vista" apart from its
corporate name.1 8 Moreover, the defendant made three sales of
software products to forum residents. 9 Thus, while mindful of
the "troubling issues" presented by this new medium, the court held
that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper. 2 '
The Utah District Court in Purco Fleet Services, Inc. v. Towers,
a trademark infringement action, held that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over the defendant was proper.' The defendant registered
the trademark of the plaintiff as a domain name and used it as a
gateway to his Web site, which directly competed with the business
of the plaintiff. 22 The defendant admitted that he "wanted to
injure" the plaintiff and further, "attempted to obtain a cash
1"5 960 F. Supp. 456, 470 (D. Mass. 1997).
116 Id. at 469-70.
117 Id. at 459.
11 Id. at 460.
"9 Id. The defendant charged that it had purposely structured its conduct to
avoid the forum. Id. at 468. The defendant pointed out that the licensing
agreement was solicited by the plaintiff with negotiations conducted via phone
or in California and that the agreement was not executed in the forum state. Id.
at 469. The court agreed, but found that the breach and the Web site created
minimum contacts. Id.
20 Id. at 463, 472.
121 No. 2:98CV786G, 1999 WL 137654, at *1 (D. Utah Mar. 9, 1999).
122 id.
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settlement" to relinquish the domain name. 2 3 The court also
noted that the defendant had solicited business from a forum
resident via its Web site. 24 The court held that both the corporate
defendant and the individual defendants had "sufficient contacts so
that a fact finder could determine the commission of the intentional
torts alleged."''
25
In Bunn-O-Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Service, Inc., a
trademark infringement dispute, the District Court of Illinois found
that the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable because the effect
of the defendant's conduct was to injure the plaintiff in the forum
state, its principal place of business. 2 6 The defendant's conduct
consisted of setting up a passive Web site accessible to forum
residents. 27 The court recognized that the Web site was passive
"in the sense that customers cannot place orders with the Defendant
by accessing the site."' 28 The court further noted that the site
contained toll-free numbers inaccessible to forum residents, but also
contained local New York phone numbers. 29 The court thought
it significant that visitors to the site could enter a contest on-line
to win free coffee. The court observed, however, that no forum
resident had actually entered the contest. 3 ° These observations
inexplicably led the court to find that the exercise of jurisdiction
was in accordance with due process."'
'23 Id. at *1, *3.
124 Id. at *3.
125 Id. at *4.
126 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1375, 1377 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
127 Id. at 1377.
128 Id. at 1376.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1377. But see Scherr v. Abrahams, No. 97-C 5453, 1998 WL
299678, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1998) (holding that a Web site with 20,000
subscribers plus 60 subscribers of a publication sold at forum state newsstands
were insufficient contacts for the exercise of jurisdiction); American Homecare
Fed'n, Inc. v. Paragon Scientific Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D. Conn. 1998)
(holding that the a Web site which contained the allegedly infringing mark, a
toll-free phone number and announced an essay contest, insufficient for the
exercise of jurisdiction). See infra Part III.D, discussing the Scherr and American
Homecare decisions.
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B. The Mere Knowledge or Foreseeability Focus
Although they may have couched it in different terms, the
District Courts of the Second, Fourth, Fifth and Eight Circuits have
exercised jurisdiction over defendants by focusing their analysis on
the defendants' mere knowledge or foreseeability of the global
reach of their Web site.132 In Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction
Set, Inc., a domain name dispute, the District Court of Connecticut
held that personal jurisdiction over the defendant did not violate
due process, because minimum contacts were established by the
defendant's action of purposefully directing their "advertising
activities via the Internet and its toll-free number toward not only
the [forum state], but to all states." 133 The court, pointing to the
limited life paper advertisements as compared to the continuous
accessibility of an advertisement on the Internet, concluded that the
defendant "could reasonably anticipate the possibility of being
haled into [the forum state].' ' 134 Thus, the district court found
personal jurisdiction based solely upon a passive Web site, because
of the potential that the site could be accessed by any or all of the
10,000 forum residents.135
A district court in the Western District of North Carolina, in
Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, a trademark infringement declaratory
judgment action, 136 made unsubstantiated assumptions in order to
132 See Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.N.C. 1997);
Haelan Prods., Inc. v. Beso Biological Research, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1672 (E.D.
La. 1997); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996);
Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
133 937 F. Supp. at 165.
134 Id.
135 Id. But see Origin Instruments Corp. v. Adaptive Computer Sys., Inc.,
No. CIV. A. 397 CV2595-L., 1999 WL 76794, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 1999)
(holding that the possibility that the defendant may do business with the forum
through its Web site is insufficient to confer jurisdiction). See infra Part III.D,
discussing the Origin Instruments decision.
136 FED. R. CIV. P. 57. In a declaratory judgment action the parties seek a
determination by the court of their rights and obligations. SHREVE & RAVEN-
HANSEN, supra note 97, § 105, at 455. "Declaratory judgment actions are
particularly useful in resolving trademark disputes" because disputes can be
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acquire personal jurisdiction over the defendant.1 37 The court
assumed that a large number of forum residents had visited the
defendant's Web site. 38 The court further assumed that some
forum residents had used the defendant's commercial services and
that a number of forum residents had acquired credit cards offered
by the defendant. 139 The foundation for these assumptions was
that the forum state is densely populated. 140 On these assumptions
of Internet activity, the court held that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant was proper. 141
The only Internet decision exercising general jurisdiction 142
over a defendant was issued by the Eastern District Court of
Louisiana. In Haelan Products, Inc. v. Beso Biological Research,
Inc., a trademark infringement action, the court found that the
exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendant was proper.1 43
The court concluded that the defendant's minimum contacts with
resolved quickly, often before the harm has fully impacted the mark owner.
Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 84 F.3d 592, 596 (2d Cir. 1996).
137 987 F. Supp. at 486.
138 Id.
139 Id.
'40 Id. at 487.
141 Id.
'42 A court exercises "general jurisdiction" over a defendant when the cause
of action does not arise out of the defendant's contacts with the state, in contrast
to "specific jurisdiction" where the suit arises out of the defendant's contacts
with the state. Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 n.8, 415 n.9 (1984) (drawing a distinction between "general jurisdiction" and
"specific jurisdiction" and holding that "general jurisdiction" could only be
exercised over a defendant if his contacts with the state were "continuous and
systematic"). In Helicopteros, the Columbian corporate defendant's contacts with
the forum were held not to be continuous and systematic, as such contacts
basically consisted of: purchasing helicopters, equipment and training services
from a forum manufacturer; sending its personnel to the forum for training;
accepting into the corporation's New York bank account checks drawn on a bank
in the forum and the appearance in the forum of the corporation's chief executive
officer for a contract-negotiation seminar. Id. at 411. The Court thus set the
threshold for "minimum contacts" at a higher level for "general jurisdiction" than
that required by due process for "specific jurisdiction." FREIDENTHAL, supra note
95, § 3.10, at 124.
143 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1672, 1674 (E.D. La. 1997).
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the forum were systematic and continuous.'" These systematic
and continuous contacts consisted of an Internet address used to
solicit and advertise its product, the accessibility of the Web site by
forum residents twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, a
nationwide toll-free number, and advertising in four nationally
distributed publications.145 The court also noted the limited
existence of paper medium compared to the enduring nature of an
advertisement on the Internet. 146 The court reasoned that its
decision was not based upon the Web site alone; rather, it found
jurisdiction based on the defendant's intent to attract customers
nationwide as evidenced by the presence of the Web site.'47
In the Eastern District of Missouri, the court faced a personal.
jurisdiction Internet question in Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., a
trademark infringement case. 148 In Maritz, the court acknow-
ledged that communications via computer are of a different nature
than contacts previously considered by courts. 14 9 The district
court opined that since modern technology had simplified commer-
cial transactions the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction must
correspondingly expand. 5 ° The defendant's Internet advertise-
ment service was not yet operational.15' The court found that the
defendant's posting of information on the Internet about its
upcoming service and inviting users to join its mailing list
constituted a conscious decision on its part to transmit advertising
information to all Internet users globally. 5 2 This factor was
buttressed by the court's unexplained finding that the defendant's
Web site received 131 hits from residents of the forum state. 53
'44 Id. at 1674.
141 Id. at 1675.
146 id.
147 Id. at 1676.
148 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
149 Id. at 1334.
150 Id.
' Id. at 1330.
152 Id. at 1333.
153 Id.
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Thus, the court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
the California defendant was proper.
54
Similarly, a judge in the same court in Archdiocese of St. Louis
v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., a trademark infringement
dispute, applied the reasoning of Maritz and held that the exercise
of jurisdiction was proper.1 55 The defendant operated a Web site
that contained limited information on St. Louis, the then upcoming
visit of the Pope, and "an assortment of 'off-color' stories and
jokes regarding the Pope and the Roman Catholic Church."' 156
The site advertised and provided hyperlinks to the defendant's adult
entertainment Web sites."'157e court found that the Web site
was not passive "but rather ... aggressively encourages users to
hyperlink to other websites which advertise, promote, and sell adult
entertainment services and products."'' 58 The court believed it to
be clear that the defendant not only was communicating its
activities globally but specifically and purposefully directed its
activities at forum residents, noting that a number of forum
residents contacted the Archdiocese to complain about the defen-
dant's Web site.'59 Consequently, the court held that jurisdiction
over the defendant was proper.
154 Id. at 1334. But see Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that the existence of a Web site without something
more is insufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction), aff'd on other grounds, 126
F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). Two commentators, unable to reconcile the Maritz
decision with the decision rendered in Bensusan, termed this the "Missouri
Rule." Hamilton & Castanias, supra note 13, at 27. See infra Part III. D,
discussing the Bensusan decision. The idea behind the "Missouri Rule" is that
the Missourian always wins. Hamilton & Castanias, supra note 13, at 27. In
Maritz, the Missouri court exercised jurisdiction over a California defendant
while in Bensusan, a New York court declined to exercise jurisdiction over a
Missouri defendant. Hamilton & Castanias, supra note 13, at 27. Apparently, the
"Missouri Rule" is enjoying continued success. See Archdiocese of St. Louis v.
Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., No. 4:99CV27SNL, 1999 WL 66022 (E.D.
Mo. Feb. 12, 1999) (applying the Maritz court's reasoning and holding that the
exercise of jurisdiction over the non-Missourian defendant proper).
"' No. 4:99CV27SNL, 1999 WL 66022, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 1999).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at *5.
159 Id.
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C. The "Something More" Focus
Many courts have held that the exercise of jurisdiction over a
defendant based on a Web site without "something more" would
violate due process. 160 For these courts, the "something more"
must be a manifestation of the defendant's intent. However, which
additional factors are sufficient to constitute a manifestation of
intent demonstrative of "purposeful availment" remains uncertain.
Some courts resort to legal fiction to find jurisdiction proper by
using characteristics of the Web site as additional factors. Yet other
courts refuse to employ a legal fiction to exercise jurisdiction.
From one circuit to the next, it is unclear what constitutes a basis
for jurisdiction, and even within the circuits, opinions can be
diametrically opposed.
1. Jurisdiction Found on Tangible Manifestations
District courts within the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have
analyzed jurisdiction by focusing on the "something more," or
"plus factor" approach, where the additional facts were substantive,
i.e., the amount of interaction with forum customers.1 6' An often
cited Western District Court of Pennsylvania decision took a
unique approach to exercising personal jurisdiction over a defen-
dant by applying tangible manifestations to a sliding scale analysis.
In Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., a domain
name dispute, the court developed a sliding scale approach to
assess whether Internet contacts satisfy minimum contacts.'62 At
one end of the scale, the court placed interactive sites where the
160 See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997);
Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 26, 1997); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), aff'd on other grounds, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
161 See Park Inns Int'l, Inc. v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 762
(D. Ariz. 1998); Telephone Audio Prods., Inc. v. Smith, No. CIV.A.3:97-CV-
0863-P, 1998 WL 159932, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 1998); Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Penn. 1997).
162 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
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exercise of jurisdiction would be proper.163 At the other end of
the scale, the court placed passive Web sites where the exercise of
jurisdiction would be improper. 64 In the middle of the scale, the
court placed "interactive Web sites where a user can exchange
information with the host computer ... [where] the exercise of
[personal] jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of
interactivity." 165
In Zippo, the defendant's conduct fell in the middle of the
scale, as users wishing to subscribe to the defendant's news service
could complete an online application.1 66 The defendant had 3,000
forum residents as subscribers, amounting to two percent of its
140,000 subscribers. 67 In addition, the defendant "entered into
seven contracts with Internet access providers to furnish its services
to their customers in [the forum]."168 Thus, the court held that the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant was proper. 169
In Telephone Audio Productions, Inc. v. Smith, a trademark
infringement case, the Northern District Court of Texas also held
that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant was proper.1 70
In addition to the defendant's Web page, which displayed the
allegedly infringing mark and was accessible to forum residents,
the defendant had attended a trade show in the forum state and
displayed the infringing trademark. 71 Further, the defendant had
solicited customers and received four orders from distributors in the
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1121.
167 Id. at 1121, 1126-27.
168 Id. at 1126.
169 Id. at 1128. But see Scherr v. Abrahams, No. 97 C 5453, 1998 WL
299678, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1998) (holding that three percent distribution
in the forum state was a low level of activity and insufficient for the exercise of
jurisdiction). See infra Part Il.D, discussing the Scherr decision.
170 No. CIV.A.3:97-CV-0863-P, 1998 WL 159932, at *3 & n.5 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 26, 1998).
171 Id. at *3.
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forum state.172 Moreover, the defendant had advertised in a trade
magazine. 17
3
In Park Inns International, Inc. v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, Inc.,
the District Court of Arizona exercised jurisdiction over a defen-
dant whose Web site provided a reservation form to be completed
online, listed a toll-free number and an e-mail address. 174 The
defendant also posted its hotel profile on an automated computer
reservations network.'75 Further, the hotel profile appeared in two
publications. 176 Finally, the defendant received 116 reservations
from forum residents as a result of its marketing program.
177
Thus, district courts within the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits
have found the exercise of jurisdiction proper when based upon
tangible manifestations of intent. However, it is apparent that these
manifestations cannot be categorized with certainty, as it is unclear
whether the courts' interpretation of the quality of the defendants'
contact with the forum is dependent upon the success of the
defendants' advertising endeavors to solicit forum customers.
2. Jurisdiction Found on a Medley of Legal Fiction and
Tangible Factors
District courts of the First, Second, Sixth and Federal Circuits
have used substantive factors buttressed by legal fiction to exercise
jurisdiction over defendants. 178 The only Court of Appeals Inter-
net trademark decision using this combination is CompuServe, Inc.
v. Patterson.179 In CompuServe, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit found the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 5 F. Supp. 2d 762, 764 (D. Ariz. 1998).
175 Id. at 765.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Gary
Scott Int'l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1997); American
Network, Inc. v. Access Am./Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
179 89 F.3d 1257.
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to be proper.1 80 CompuServe, a trademark infringement declarato-
ry judgment action, the issues arose out of an online shareware
agreement. 18' The court found that the defendant "knowingly
made an effort-and, in fact, [had] purposefully contracted-to
market a product in other states, with Ohio-based CompuServe
operating, in effect, as his distribution center."' 182
The court noted that standing on its own, the online contract
would be insufficient for jurisdiction. 183 The court, therefore
created a legal fiction by separating the online shareware agreement
into two facets in order to acquire jurisdiction. 184 The court
separated the contract from its subject. Thus, the court found that
purposeful availment was satisfied by the contract, and the "stream
of commerce" test was satisfied by the injection of the defendant's
shareware into the stream of commerce. 185
In Gary Scott International, Inc. v. Baroudi, the District Court
of Massachusetts likewise found jurisdiction to be proper over the
180 Id. at 1268-69.
181 Id. at 1260-61. Shareware is "a software package that an author
distributes without charge, but for which payment is required if the user decides
to keep it and use it." ALLISON, supra note 4, at 337. Here, CompuServe
operated as the electronic conduit between its subscribers and the defendant.
CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1260. The defendant entered into this agreement with
CompuServe by typing in "AGREE" in a form online. Id. Over a period of three
years, the defendant electronically transmitted 32 master software files to
CompuServe who stored the files on their system in Ohio and displayed them to
their subscribers. Id. at 1261. The defendant sold less than $650 worth of
software to 12 Ohio residents. Id. It is of some consequence to note that the
defendant filed no appellant brief nor did he appear at oral argument. Id. at 1261.
182 Id. at 1263.
183 Id. at 1265.
184 id.
185 Id. at 1265, 1268. See supra note 91 (discussing the "stream of
commerce" test). One commentator asserts that the Patterson court's well
reasoned decision has "brought the jurisdictional wheel full circle" by providing
"a flexible approach for addressing the globalization of commerce." Daniel V.
Logue, Note, If the International Shoe Fits Wear It: Applying Traditional
Personal Jurisdiction Analysis to Cyberspace in CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,
42 VILL. L. REv. 1213, 1254 (1997). But see Brodsky, supra note 102, at 856
(asserting that the Patterson court's decision is a major step backwards for the
law of personal jurisdiction).
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defendant. 186 The court's decision turned on the fact that the
defendant contracted to sell twelve of the infringing items to a
retailer in the forum state. 187 In addition, the defendant sold his
product over the Internet, which the court viewed as a solicitation
aimed at forum residents. 188 Finally, the court found it significant
that the defendant told a colleague that he planned to sell even a
larger quantity to a large chain store that did business in the
forum. 8
9
In American Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta,
Inc., the Southern District Court of New York found that jurisdic-
tion existed over a defendant who advertised its services on its
home page.' 90 As a result of the Web site, the defendant had
signed up six New York subscribers out of a customer base of
7,500.'91 The six subscribers accounted for $1,800 per year of
revenue out of total revenue of $2,340,000.192 The defendant's
advertisement on its passive Web page, stating that it had the
ability to aid customers "across the U.S.," was, to the court, a
further manifestation of the defendant's intent to reach customers
nationwide, making it foreseeable that the defendant could be haled
into court.193
The District of Columbia District Court, in Heroes, Inc. v.
Heroes Foundation, found that jurisdiction was proper in a
trademark infringement case.' 94 The court noted that the defen-
dant's home page containing the allegedly infringing mark was
accessible to forum residents. 95 The page also explicitly solicited
donations. A toll-free number was provided for a user to receive
186 981 F. Supp. 714, 717 (D. Mass. 1997).
187 Id. at 716-17.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 975 F. Supp. 494, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
'9' Id. at 496.
192 Id.
193 Id. But see Scherr v. Abrahams, No. 97 C 5453, 1998 WL 299678, at *1
(N.D. I11. May 29, 1998) (holding 20,000 Internet subscribers and 60 forum
subscribers insufficient contacts for the exercise of jurisdiction). See infra Part
III.D, discussing the Scherr decision.
'94 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
'9' Id. at 4.
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information on making a donation. 196 Additionally, the court
found that the defendant's contact with the forum was not limited
to its Web site. The court noted that an advertisement inviting
donations was published in the Washington Post, which was
available in the forum. 197
Thus, district courts within the First, Second, Sixth and Federal
Circuits as well as the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit found the exercise of jurisdiction proper based on a medley
of legal fiction and tangible factors. This combination fails to
provide certainty or foreseeability of what the court will impute in
order to obtain jurisdiction and leads to inconsistent results.
3. Jurisdiction Found on Legal Fiction
District courts within the First, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have
substituted legal fiction to acquire jurisdiction over a defendant
when tangible manifestations of intent beyond a Web site are not
present.198 In Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., the District
Court of Massachusetts, in a domain dispute, found that the
defendant purposefully directed its advertising at all states and took
no steps to avoid the forum state, and therefore exercised jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.1 99
The defendant advertised its Internet consulting business on its
Web site.200 The Web page stated that the defendant "provides
services for clients anywhere on the planet., 201 The court noted
that traditional personal jurisdiction concepts required a sensitivity
to the unique nature of cyberspace and that the courts had reached
196 Id.
197 Id. at 3. The court discounted the defendant's assertion that it did not pay
for the advertisement. Id. Rather, the advertisement was paid for and placed by
Proctor & Gamble. Id. The court determined that this was not material, as the
defendant had known the advertisement was to be placed, had approved it, and
had benefitted from it. Id.
198 Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997);
Quality Solutions, Inc. v. Zupanc, 993 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
'99 994 F. Supp. at 45.
200 Id. at 38.
201 Id.
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conflicting results. 2  The court then determined that the fourm
residents had "undoubtedly" accessed the defendant's Web site.2 °3
The court found that the twenty-four hour a day, seven day a week
accessibility of the Web site, coupled with a user's instant capabili-
ty to transmit e-mail to the company, was sufficient for the exercise
of jurisdiction.2 °4
The Northern District Court of Ohio, in a trademark infringe-
ment and domain name case, found jurisdiction proper without
analysis of the Internet or the appropriateness of the application of
minimum contacts to the medium.20 5 In Quality Solutions, Inc. v.
Zupanc, the court exercised jurisdiction premised upon the
defendant's advertisement in a trade journal which had the third
largest circulation figures in the forum state.2 6 The court found
the defendant's operation of an accessible Web site even more
compelling in asserting jurisdiction.2 7 Finding that these facts
"represent[ed] deliberate attempts" by the defendant to solicit
business in the forum state, the court held that jurisdiction was
consistent with due process.20 8
Thus, district courts within the First, Sixth and Seventh Circuits
have found the exercise of jurisdiction proper based upon legal
fiction in the absence of any tangible manifestations of intent by
the defendant. These courts have used the mere accessibility of a
Web site as justification for jurisdiction while imputing intent.
202 Id. at 39.
203 Id. at 44.
204 Id. at 38, 44, 46. But see Desktop Techs., Inc. v. Colorworks Reprod. &
Design, Inc., No. CIV. A. 98-5029, 1999 WL 98572, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25,
1999) (holding e-mail capability insufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction as the
electronic equivalent of advertising response cards). See infra Part III.D,
discussing the Desktop Technologies decision.
205 Quality Solutions, Inc. v. Zupanc, 993 F. Supp. 621, 623 (N.D. Ohio
1997).
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 id.
492
TRADEMARK INTERNET JURISDICTION
D. Jurisdiction Not Found
Courts in the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have declined to exercise jurisdiction in cases factually
analogous to those discussed above'0 9 In the only Court of
Appeals decision declining to exercise jurisdiction, the Ninth
Circuit in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., concluded that the
defendant's Internet contacts did not constitute "purposeful
availment. ' ' 2'0 The court characterized the defendant's Web site
as "an essentially passive home page" which "did nothing to
encourage people in [the forum state] to access its site."2"'
Additionally, the court found that the site was not accessed by any
209 See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997);
Desktop Techs., Inc. v. Colorworks Reprod. & Design, Inc., No. CIV. A. 98-
5029, 1999 WL 98572, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1999); Origin Instruments Corp.
v. Adaptive Computer Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 397CV2595-L., 1999 WL 76794,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 1999); Pheasant Run, Inc. v. Moyse, No. 98 C 4202,
1999 WL 58562, at *1 (N.D. I11. Feb. 3, 1999); Millennium Enters., Inc. v.
Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 907 (D. Or. 1999); American Homecare
Fed'n, Inc. v. Paragon Scientific Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D. Conn. 1998);
K.C.P.L., Inc. v. Nash, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1584 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); No Mayo-San
Francisco v. Memminge, No. C-98-1392 PJH., 1998 WL 544974, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 20, 1998); CFOS 2 GO, Inc. v. CFO 2 GO, Inc., No. C 97-4676 SI.,
1998 WL 320821, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 1998); Scherr v. Abrahams, No. 97
C 5453, 1998 WL 299678, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1998); SF Hotel Co. v.
Energy Investments, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan. 1997); CD Solutions, Inc.
v. Tooker, 965 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No.
96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997); Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affid on other
grounds, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
210 130 F.3d at 419-20.
211 Id. But see Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, 994 F. Supp. 34, 45 (D.
Mass. 1997); Haelan Prods., Inc. v. Beso Biological Research, Inc., 43
U.S.P.Q.2d 1672, 1676 (E.D. La. 1997); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996). In these cases the courts adopted an
antithetical approach in finding that the mere existence of the defendants' Web
sites constituted "purposeful availment" as manifestations of the defendants'
intent to reach customers in the forum as well as other states.
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forum resident save the plaintiff nor had any forum resident signed
up for the defendant's services. 12
In CFOS 2 GO, Inc. v. CFO 2 GO, Inc., the Northern District
Court of California found that the facts here were analogous to
Cybersell and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.213 The court determined that the defendant was not a
"cyberpirate."21 4 Further, the district court determined that the
defendant's passive Web site, which was never fully "up and
running" and contained only "contact information and a description
of the defendant's business," was insufficient for jurisdiction to
vest.2" 5
Similarly, a magistrate judge in the same court in No
Mayo-San Francisco v. Memminger held that "simply registering
someone else's trademark as a domain name and posting a Web
site on the Internet" was insufficient to subject the defendant to the
jurisdiction of the forum. 2 16 The court declined to exercise
jurisdiction in spite of plaintiff's allegations that the defendant had
offered to sell the issue of the controversy, the domain name, to
it.2
17
The Oregon District Court, in Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v.
Millennium Music, L.P., declined to exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant in a trademark infringement action.218 The court,
borrowing from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, noted that
"attempting to apply traditional notions of personal jurisdiction" to
the Internet is "somewhat like trying to board a moving bus. 2 19
The defendant's Web site was interactive in that it permitted the
purchase of compact discs.22 ° One forum resident had in fact
212 Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419.
213 CFOS 2 GO, 1998 WL 320821, at *4.
214 Id. at *3.
2i5 Id. at *3 & n.1.
216 No. C-98-1392 PJH., 1998 WL 544974, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1998).
217 Id. But see Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th
Cir. 1998) (holding jurisdiction proper in part because the defendant offered to
sell the domain name to the plaintiff).
218 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999).
219 Id. at 914 (quoting Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27
(2d Cir. 1997)).
220 Id. at 911, 921.
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purchased a compact disc via the Web site; however, the court was
dismayed by the "plaintiff's counsel's lack of candor" in that the
single purchase was orchestrated by the plaintiff to obtain jurisdic-
tion.22" ' The court held, therefore, that since the defendant made
no other sales through its Web site to forum residents, "the
questionable and unprofessional ... unilateral acts of the plaintiff'
could not subject the defendant to jurisdiction in the forum.2 22
In Scherr v. Abrahams, an action of trademark infringement, the
Northern District Court in Illinois held that the defendants' contacts
with the forum were insufficient to create jurisdiction.223 The
defendants published a satire publication with fewer than sixty
subscribers in the forum state and had an even smaller number of
newsstand sales, both of which amounted to a three percent
distribution in the forum state.224 The defendants had also pub-
lished an electronic newsletter on their Web site to which twenty
thousand users had subscribed via e-mail. 225 The court determined
that the level of activity on the defendants' Web site was "rather
low" and that nothing on the Internet site was specifically targeted
at the forum state and as such jurisdiction could not be obtained
over the defendants.226
Similarly, the senior judge in the same court, in Pheasant Run,
Inc. v. Moyse held that a Web site allegedly posted by a third party
was insufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction.227 In this trade-
mark infringement case, the defendant operated a restaurant using
the plaintiff's mark.228 The Web site, which defendant claimed to
be unauthorized, contained a one paragraph advertisement and
221 Id. at 911.
222 Id.
223 No. 97 C 5453, 1998 WL 299678, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1998).
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. at *5. But see Bunn-O-Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Serv., Inc., 46
U.S.P.Q.2d 1375, 1377 (C.D. 1Il. 1998) (finding jurisdiction proper where the
defendant had a passive Web site that invited users to enter a coffee contest
which no forum resident entered). See also American Network, Inc. v. Access
Am./Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding
jurisdiction proper where defendant had six subscribers in the forum).
227 No. 98 C 4202, 1999 WL 58562, at *1 (N.D. I. Feb. 3, 1999).
228 id.
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listed a local phone number for the restaurant. 2 9 The Web site
was passive and did not provide for communication from the
user. 230 The court determined that this scenario did "not even
come close to establishing ... minimum contacts with [the]
state." '231
The Kansas District Court, in SF Hotel Co. v. Energy Invest-
ments, Inc.,232 a declaratory judgment trademark infringement
action, applied the sliding scale analysis set forth in Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.233 The court declined
to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant based on a passive Web
site. The site only provided general information about the ho-
tel.23 4 Moreover, the court found that the fact that one forum
235
resident stayed at the defendant's hotel was de minimis.
The Northern District Court of Texas, similarly applied the
Zippo sliding scale analysis in Origin Instruments Corp. v.
Adaptive Computer Systems, Inc., a trademark infringement
231
action.2 6 In Origin Instruments, the court found that the defen-
dant's Web site fell in the middle of the Zippo scale as it provided
for a "moderate level of interactivity., 237 This "moderate" interac-
tivity included the posting of product information, the ability of a
user to purchase the product with the infringing mark, to purchase
and immediately download software, and to communicate with the
defendant.238 The court, however, found that the defendant had
not made any sales to forum residents and declined to exercise
229 Id. at *2.
230 Id.
231 Id. at *3.
232 985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan. 1997).
233 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
234 SF Hotel Co., 985 F. Supp. at 1035.
235 Id. at 1034. But see Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. Supp. 481
(W.D.N.C. 1997) (holding that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper based upon
the assumption that forum residents must have transacted business with the
defendant because the forum state is densely populated). See supra Part III.B,
discussing Superguide decision.
236 No. CIV. A. 3:97-CV-2595-L, 1999 WL 76794, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
3, 1999).
237 Id. at *4.
238 Id. at *1, *3.
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jurisdiction premised upon the possibility that the defendant may
do business with a forum resident.239
Another judge in the same court, in CD Solutions, Inc. v.
Tooker, also declined to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant in
a declaratory judgment action where the use of a domain name was
at issue.24' The court held that the plaintiff's use of the domain
name was the issue of the suit and as such the claim did not arise
out of the defendant's contact with the forum.241 The court
transferred the action to the state where the defendant resided.242
The Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania, in Desktop
Technologies, Inc. v. Colorworks Reproduction & Design, Inc., a
trademark infringement dispute, declined to exercise jurisdiction
over the defendant.243 The court characterized the defendant's
Web site as "tantamount to a passive advertisement.",2' The court
further accepted the analogy that the ability to e-mail the defendant
was the "electronic equivalent[] of advertisements' response
cards., 245 The court held that the ability to exchange files over
the Internet with the defendant coupled with the e-mail capability
was insufficient to sustain jurisdiction. 246 The court noted further
that the defendant's Web site specifically listed the places that it
serviced clients and the forum was not listed among them.247
The Connecticut District Court, in American Homecare
Federation, Inc. v. Paragon Scientific Corp., a trademark infringe-
ment action, declined to exercise jurisdiction based upon a passive
239 Id. at *4.
240 965 F. Supp. 17, 20 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
241 Id. at 20.
242 Id. at 21.
243 No. CIV. A. 98-5029, 1999 WL 98572, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1999).
244 Id. at *4.
245 Id. (quoting Grutkowski v. Steamboat Lake Guides & Outfitters, Inc., No.
Civ. A. 98-1453, 1998 WL 962042, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 1998) (internal
quotations omitted)).
24 Id. at *6. But see Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34
(D. Mass. 1997) (holding that the 24-hour accessibility of the Web site together
with the e-mail capability was sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction). See
supra Part III.C.3, discussing Hasbro decision.
247 Id. at *6.
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Web site.248 The defendant's Web site contained the allegedly
infringing mark, displayed a toll-free phone number and announced
to all hemophilia chapters, including the one located in the forum,
an essay writing contest that children afflicted with hemophilia
could enter.249 Further, the defendant advertised once in a nation-
al trade journal accessible to forum residents. 2 0 The court, noting
that no essays were received from forum residents, declined to
exercise jurisdiction and held that the two acts were de mini-
mis.251
Judges of the Southern District Court of New York have held
in three different domain name and trademark infringement cases,
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction based upon a passive or
non-operational Web site violates due process. In Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction
over a defendant who operated a passive Web site. 52 The defen-
dant operated a Web site which allegedly contained a substantially
similar mark to the plaintiff's trademark.253 The court noted that
in order for a user to access the Web site, they would be required
to take affirmative steps. 254 The court held that "creating a Web
site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be
248 27 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D. Conn. 1998).
249 Id. at 112, 114.
250 Id. at 114.
251 Id. But see Bunn-O-Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Serv., Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.
2d 1375 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that jurisdiction was proper based on passive
Web site that enabled users to enter into a coffee contest which no forum user
had done). See also supra Part III.A, discussing the Bunn-O-Matic decision.
252 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
253 Id. at 297.
254 Id. at 299. This observation would obviously hold true for every Internet
case. See Perritt, supra note 65, at 21 (discussing "pulling" technology and
analogizing it to a vending machine). The court, apparently failing to appreciate
the significance of a recognizable domain name such as "The Blue Note," also
noted that an additional step would be needed to access a search engine to locate
the site. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 299. The court further pointed to the fact that
tickets for shows at the defendant's club could only be purchased in the forum
state. Id.
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felt nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without more, it is not
an act purposefully directed to the forum state." '255
In K.C.P.L., Inc. v. Nash, the same court declined to exercise
jurisdiction over a California defendant who "registered four
domain names, only one of which [was] alleged to resemble
another's trademark. 256 It was undisputed that the defendant sold
no goods or services, his Web site was non-operational and in fact
when accessed simply stated "under construction., 257 The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant was a "cyberpirate," based upon his
refusal of its offer to pay him $1,500 and instead demanded
$15,000.258 The defendant denied the allegations. 259 The court
declined to characterize the defendant as a "cyberpirate" or to
exercise jurisdiction.26 °
In Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, a magistrate judge declined to
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant whose Web site was not
yet operational, stating that the exercise of personal jurisdiction,
"would, in effect, create national (or even worldwide) jurisdic-
tion. ,261 The court analogized the defendant's Web site to a
national magazine in that, like an advertisement in a magazine, the
Web site may be viewed by people across the country. 262 Further,
255 Id. at 301. But see Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328,
1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that the defendant's not yet operational Web site
was sufficient to confer jurisdiction); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937
F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding that a passive Web site was
sufficient to confer jurisdiction). One commentator has asserted that the Bensusan
decision "set forth the seminal approach by applying current legal standards in
a clear and consistent manner." Timothy B. Nagy, Comment, Personal
Jurisdiction and Cyberspace: Establishing Precedent in a Borderless Era, 6
CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 101, 112 (1998). But see Sam Puathasnanon, Note,
Cyberspace and Personal Jurisdiction: The Problem of Using Internet Contacts
to Establish Minimum Contacts, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 691, 721 (1998) (asserting
that approach of court in Bensusan is unnecessarily restrictive).
256 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1584, 1591 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
257 Id. at 1587-88.
258 Id. at 1586.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 1591.
26' No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
262 Id. at *10. But see Haelan Prods., Inc. v. Beso Biological Research, Inc.,
43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1672, 1675 (E.D. La. 1997) (noting that the difference between
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the court declined "to reach such a result in the absence of a
Congressional enactment of Internet specific trademark infringe-
ment personal jurisdictional legislation.,,263 Thus, to date, the
Hearst court is the only court to recognize that the unique
problems presented by trademark issues and the Internet require
resolution through legislative enactment.
These opinions demonstrate that the application of traditional
personal jurisdiction analysis cannot, and has not, been consistently
applied by the federal courts. The decisions raise more questions
than they answer. It is unclear what factors may constitute
manifestations of the defendant's intent satisfying purposeful
availment. Additional factors sufficient to qualify as something
more remain undefined and it is indeterminate when the defen-
dant's actions will demonstrate his knowledge of the effect his
conduct will have on the plaintiff.
Some commentators explain the incongruity of the decisions by
charging the courts with a lack of understanding of the
Internet.2 4 Others charge that traditional legal paradigms cannot
be applied to the Internet.265 It is clear, however, that the courts
paper medium and a Web site is in the limited life of the paper medium).
263 Hearst Corp., 1997 WL 97097, at *20 (emphasis added).
264 Brodsky, supra note 102, at 844; Hamilton & Castanias, supra note 13,
at 27.
265 See David R. Johnson & David G. Post, The Rise of Law on the Global
Network, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 3, 15 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson
eds., 1998) (advocating separate laws applicable to trademarks in cyberspace);
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Role of Intermediaries, in
BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 164, 188 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1998)
(advocating the creation of a "Virtual Magistrate" to arbitrate cyberspace
disputes). But see Harlan B. Williams, Jr., The Internet - A Basis for Jurisdic-
tion?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Feb. 1998 <http://www.lawworks-iptoday.com/02-
98/williams.htm> (asserting that the minimum contacts test of International Shoe
provides adequate guidance in Intemet litigation); Corey B. Ackerman, Note,
World-Wide Volkswagen, Meet the World Wide Web: An Examination of
Personal Jurisdiction Applied to a New World, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 403
(1997) (asserting that new rules are unnecessary; only respect for International
Shoe and its progeny is required); Christine E. Mayewski, Note, The Presence
of a Web Site as a Constitutionally Permissible Basis for Personal Jurisdiction,
73 IND. L.J. 297 (1997) (contending that traditional jurisdiction doctrine works
because it provides flexibility needed for this medium); Dale M. Cendali &
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are unable to consistently and uniformly apply a traditional legal
framework that has not yet evolved to meet this incomparable
medium.
The Supreme Court has said that the "Due Process Clause gives
a degree of predictability ... that allows ... defendants to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as
to where that conduct will or will not render them liable to
suit. ' 266 Unfortunately, the body of law resulting from personal
jurisdiction Internet decisions in trademark cases fails to apprise
any defendant of what conduct regarding a globally accessible
Internet site will subject them to jurisdiction and where. Conse-
quently, these cases violate the purpose of due process.
IV. THE HISTORY AND POLICY OF TRADEMARK LAW
Trademark law serves two functions: to protect consumers from
deceit and confusion in the marketplace and to protect the trade-
mark holder's goodwill built up in the mark.26 7 Trademarks
promote economic efficiency in that they encourage the production
of quality products and reduce the customer's costs of shopping
and making purchase decisions.268 Uniformity is the underpinning
of trademark law. This policy prompted the enactment of the
Lanham Act and was reflected in each amendment. The need for
uniformity, consistency and predictability compelled Congress to
Rebecca L. Weinstein, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, N.Y.L.J., July 20,
1998, at S I (asserting that recent decisions illustrate that traditional tests can be
applied with common sense analogies). See also J. Christopher Gooch, Note, The
Internet, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Federal Long-Arm Statute: Rethinking
the Concept of Jurisdiction, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 635 (1998)
(contending that the minimum contacts test is obsolete and the focus should be
on fair play and substantial justice).
266 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
267 H.R. REP. No. 79-219, at 2-3 (1945).
268 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §§ 2:2, 2:3, at 2-3. See also William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L.
& ECON. 265 (1987) (asserting that trademark law tries to promote economic
efficiency). But see Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Trouble with Trademark,
99 YALE L.J. 759 (1990) (asserting that recent changes in trademark law are
inconsistent with economic efficiency).
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act on several occasions in response to court decisions. This policy
is again threatened by inconsistent court decisions on Internet
trademark controversies and requires Congress to act once again by
amending the Lanham Act to provide for nationwide service of
process in controversies arising from Internet use.
A. Chronicle of Federal Trademark Law
Although trademark use began thousands of years ago,
trademark law is relatively young.269 The first federal legislation
providing for trademark registration was passed by Congress in
1870.270 However, the Supreme Court held the statute to be
unconstitutional as beyond the power of Congress.2  Some thirty-
five years later in 1905, the first "modem" federal registration
statute was passed.272 The Act of 1920 was a major amend-
ment.273 The purpose of the amendment was to bring national
uniformity to trademark law. Between 1920 and 1946, Congress
held hearings on various amendments to the Act of 1920.274 The
amendments were proposed "with a view to shortening litigation
and simplifying the procedure, and getting to the end of things just
269 128 CONG. REc. 25,867 (1982) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
270 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, entitled "An Act to Revise,
Consolidate and Amend the Statutes Relating to Patents and Copyrights;" 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 5:3, at 5-6.
271 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 5:3, at 5-6. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82 (1879) (holding Act of 1870 unconstitutional because it was beyond the
scope of Congress' power to regulate trademarks intrastate). Congress' power to
regulate trademarks emanates from the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 5:3, at 5-7.
272 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, entitled "An Act to
Authorize the Registration of Trade-marks Used in Commerce With Foreign
Nations or Among the Several States or With Indian Tribes, and to Protect the
Same;" 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 5:3, at 5-7.
273 Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533, entitled "An Act to Give
Effect to Certain Provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Trade-marks
and Commercial Names, Made and Signed in the City of Buenos Aires, in the
Argentine Republic, August 20, 1910, and For Other Purposes;" I McCARTHY,
supra note 5, § 5:3, at 5-8.
274 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 78-603, at 1 (1943); H.R. REP. No. 77-2283, at
1 (1942); H.R. REP. No. 70-1368, at 1 (1928); S. REP. No. 69-1576, at 1 (1927).
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as quickly as possible., 21 5 The ultimate legislation in trademark
law came with the enactment of the Federal Trademark Act of
1946, commonly referred to as the Lanham Act.276
In reporting the Lanham Bill, the Senate Committee on Patents
stated that "the purpose of this bill is to place all matters relating
to trademarks in one statute and to eliminate judicial obscurity, ...
to make procedure simple, and relief against infringement prompt
and effective., 277 The Senate Committee concluded that "sound
public policy requires that trademarks should receive nationally the
greatest protection that can be given them. '278
The most sweeping changes to the Lanham Act in forty-two
years came in 1988 when Congress enacted the Trademark Law
Revision Act.279 Congress determined that a revision of the
Lanham Act was needed to bring trademark law in step with
"modem day commercial realities, 28 ° given that in the year the
Lanham Act was enacted, Life reported that seven cities had black
and white television, and that full color television was on its
way.28' This revision also proposed the addition of the concept
275 Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 6683 and H.R. 11988 Before the House
Comm. on Patents, 70th Cong. 120 (1928) (statement of Edward S. Rogers).
276 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 5:4, at 5-10. Congressman Fritz Garland
Lanham, a Texas lawyer who gave his name to the 1946 Trademark Act, spent
eight years working to secure its passage. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 5:4, at
5-11. The Lanham Act is codified, as amended, at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127
(1994).
277 S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946).
278 Id. at 6. The Supreme Court reaffirmed these purposes in Park 'N Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985). See also 133 CONG.
REC. 32,812-13 (1987) (introductory remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
279 Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988). The Act changed five major
areas of federal trademark law. I MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 5:3, at 5-16. The
Act included an "intent-to-use" basis for applications obviating the necessity for
"token use," added the concept of "constructive use" conferring nationwide
priority, redefined bona fide use, shortened the registration period to eliminate
"deadwood," codified case law interpretation of section 43(a) and eliminated the
technical inconsistencies from the Act. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 5:3, at 5-
16 to -17.
280 134 CONG. REc. 32,052 (1988) (statements of Sen. DeConcini).
281 S. REP. No. 100-515, at 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577,
5580.
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of trademark dilution.282 The statute, however, was ultimately
passed without the dilution amendment.2
83
At the time of the enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995 only twenty-five states had laws that prohibited
trademark dilution. 284 This resulted in a "patch-quilt" system of
protection.285 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act was enacted
to "bring uniformity and consistency to the protection of famous
marks. 286 This Act has proved to be an effective tool in prose-
cuting suits arising from domain name disputes.287 The power of
this tool was underscored by Senator Patrick J. Leahy when he
expressed his hope "that this anti-dilution statute can help stem the
use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are
choosing marks that are associated with the products and reputa-
tions of others. 288
282 133 CONG. REc. 32,813 (1987) (introductory remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
A famous trademark is diluted when subsequent uses by a third party "blur the
distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a
likelihood of confusion" by consumers. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029.
283 134 CONG. REc. 32,053 (1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
284 H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3.
285 id.
286 Id. The Act provides for "a federal cause of action to protect famous
marks from unauthorized users that attempt to trade upon the goodwill and
established renown of such marks and, thereby, dilute their distinctive quality."
Id. The Act further provides injunctive relief for the mark holder. Id.
287 Sutin, supra note 59, at 5. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141
F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant's use of plaintiff's mark
as a domain name constituted dilution of the mark); Teletech Customer Care
Management (Cal.), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., Inc., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (granting a preliminary injunction because plaintiff's mark is probably
famous and defendant's use of the mark as a domain name most likely dilutes
it); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1240-41 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(holding that use of plaintiffs famous mark as domain name which will be
displayed on every Web page is sufficient to show a likelihood of dilution).
288 141 CONG. REc. S19,312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Leahy). See also Interinatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1238.
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B. Congressional Responses to Federal Court Trademark
Decisions
The Lanham Act is "the paramount source of trademark law in
the United States., 289 Almost all trademark disputes are decided
under the Lanham Act.29° Historically, Congress has enacted
amendments to the Lanham Act to either codify court decisions or
to expressly overrule them.29' In 1975, in response to the decision
in Fleischmann Distillery Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., Congress
amended the Lanham Act to allow for attorney fees in exceptional
cases. 292 In 1982, Congress amended the Lanham Act to remind
the "trademark community of the constitutional concept of federal
supremacy. 293 The amendment overruled the decision in Century
21 Real Estate Corp. v. Nevada Real Estate Advisory Commission
by prohibiting states or state agencies from requiring trademarks to
be altered or displayed differently from the registered mark. 94
In 1984, Congress again amended the Lanham Act to nullify
the effect of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v.
General Mills Fun Group, Inc. ,295 by creating a Trademark
289 The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission
Report and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77
TRADEMARK REP. 375, 378 (1987) [hereinafter USTA Report].
290 Id. at 377.
291 S. 1883 codified the holding of California Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery,
Ltd., 774 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir. 1985), holding that "registration on the
supplemental register means that the commissioner has determined that the mark
is 'capable of distinguishing."' S. REP. No. 100-515, at 37 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5600.
292 386 U.S. 714 (1967) (holding that the Lanham Act does not provide for
an award of attorney fees for the prevailing party in a trademark infringement
action). See USTA Report, supra note 289, at 377.
293 USTA Report, supra note 289, at 379.
294 448 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Nev. 1978) (holding that the Lanham Act did not
preempt the Nevada Real Estate Commission from regulating the use of a
federally registered trademark). See Lanham Act § 39, 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994);
H.R. REP. No. 97-778, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2621; USTA
Report, supra note 289, at 377.
295 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the mark "Monopoly" had
become a generic term based on a motivational survey test).
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Generic Standard.296 In a drastic deviation from the accepted
standard, the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit reversed the
lower court and, based upon a purchaser motivation survey, held
that the mark "Monopoly" as the name of Parker Brothers'
"Monopoly" game had become generic and therefore would not be
entitled to trademark protection. 297 The legislative response was
designed to ensure consistency between judicial circuits and to
safeguard the predictability of trademark law by providing a
uniform test for genericness that repudiated purchaser motiva-
tion.298 The resulting predictability of trademark law serves to
protect both consumers and business in furtherance of trademark
law's twin purposes.299
Congress, undeterred by its unsuccessful attempt to enact an
anti-dilution statute in 1988, responded by enacting the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 to further foster the national
uniformity policy of the Lanham Act.3 °° Courts had become
296 See 129 CONG. REc. 15,279 (1983) (statement of Sen. Hatch); USTA
Report, supra note 289, at 379. Section 14 of the Lanham Act provides that:
A registered mark shall not be deemed to be the generic name of
goods or services solely because such mark is also used as a name of
or to identify a unique product or service. The primary significance of
the registered mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser
motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered
mark has become the generic name of goods or services.
15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994). Generic marks are unable to perform the specific
function of a trademark and are not protected by the Lanham Act as they are
unable to distinguish specific goods or services. ELIAS, supra note 3, at 354. For
example, "raisin bran" is a generic phrase because it describes a type of cereal
and not the source. ELIAS, supra note 3, at 354. Consequently, the phrase "raisin
bran" by itself is not protectable. ELIAS, supra note 3, at 354. Marks may also
become generic when widely and indiscriminately used. ELIAS, supra note 3, at
355. For example, the previously protected mark "escalator" became generic and
thus not protectable as it became synonymous with all moving stairs regardless
of who manufactured them. ELIAS, supra note 3, at 355.
297 Anti-Monopoly, 684 F.2d at 1326.
298 129 CONG. REC. 15,280 (1983) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
299 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §§ 2:2, 2:3, at 2-3.
3o Trademark Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1295 Before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, Courts and Intellectual Property, available in 1995 WL 435751
(F.D.C.H.) (statement of Philip G. Hampton II, Assistant Commissioner for
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inconsistent in their determination "of the degree of fame which
will afford the mark protection against dilution."' ' In Polaroid
Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., an action by the senior user, the camera
company, against the junior user, a refrigeration and heating
installing company, the court held that the plaintiff's trade name
"was a strong name exclusively appropriated by plaintiff...
[which] had acquired a wide spread reputation and much good will,
which plaintiff should not be required to share with defendant.""3 2
In contradistinction is Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., where "Lexis," a computerized legal research
service, the senior user, commenced an action against the junior
user, "Lexus," an automobile manufacturer. The court held that the
defendant's mark did not dilute the plaintiff's mark because the
mark was not "nationally renown" and therefore not famous.3"3
Such "[u]npredictable and inadequate results for the trademark
owner" moved Congress to once again enact legislation to promote
the uniformity policy of the Lanham Act.3°4
C. The Need for Congress to Act Once Again
The predictability of trademark law is once again in jeopardy.
The decisions determining personal jurisdiction in Lanham Act
cases based upon Internet activity are chaotic and inconsistent.30 5
Since only Congress possesses the power to authorize "service of
process anywhere in the United States," it is appropriate for
Congress to intervene.30 6 This Congressional power has been
Trademarks).
301 id.
302 319 F.2d 830, 837 (7th Cir. 1963).
303 875 F.2d 1026, 1039 (2d Cir. 1989).
304 H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1030.
301 See supra Part III, discussing personal jurisdiction decisions focused on
trademarks and Internet activity.
o Mississippi Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946).
Congress has exercised this power in various federal statutes. For example,
section 12 of the Clayton Act provides that any suit or action against a
corporation under the antitrust laws may be brought in the judicial district where
the defendant is an inhabitant, is found or transacts business. 15 U.S.C. § 22
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expressly recognized as an exception to the usual limits to
service."
The Lanham Act already "confers broad jurisdictional powers
upon the courts of the United States... by grant[ing] jurisdiction
[to the district courts] over all actions 'arising under' the Act."3 8
Section 39 of the Lanham Act provides for jurisdiction "without
regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity or lack of
diversity of the citizenship of the parties.,"309 The Act of 1905
was amended by the Lanham Act to permit the courts to have
jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of the parties.310
Moreover, the remedies of the Lanham Act provide for an
injunction that is enforceable nationwide. 311 The Congressional
intent was to make the right to an injunction "as national as
(1994). The statute further provides for service of process in any district where
the defendant is an inhabitant or may be found. Id. Section 502 of ERISA
provides that an action may be brought in a district court where the plan is
administered, the place of the breach, or where the defendant resides or is found.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (1994). The statute further provides that service of
process may be served in any district in which the defendant is a resident or may
be found. Id. Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that
an action may be brought in any district where the defendant is found, resides
or transacts business. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994). The statute further provides that
service of process may be served in any district the defendant resides or is found.
Id. See also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 451 (5th ed.
1994).
307 WRIGHT, supra note 306, at 451. This power is acknowledged in rule
4(k)(1)(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 4(k)(1)(D) provides that
service of a summons or filing a waiver of service is effective to establish
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant when authorized by a statute of the
United States. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(k)(1)(D).
308 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280, 283-84 (1952) (holding
that Lanham Act has extraterritorial reach beyond the borders of United States).
309 Lanham Act § 39, 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994).
310 Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 6248 Before the House Comm. on
Patents, 69th Cong. 69-70 (1926); Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724,
entitled "An Act to Authorize the Registration of Trade-marks Used in
Commerce With Foreign Nations or Among the Several States or With Indian
Tribes, and to Protect the Same."
311 Lanham Act § 34, 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997).
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possible. 3t 2 The policy of the Lanham Act to promote national
uniformity in trademark law will best be served by an amendment
permitting nationwide jurisdiction in trademark controversies
derived from Internet use.
On October 28, 1998, President Clinton, in recognition of the
dilemma posed by jurisdictional problems arising from domain
name controversies, signed into law an amendment to the High-
Performance Computing Act of 1991.313 The amendment autho-
rized a study to be completed in nine months with the purpose to
"assess and ... make recommendations for policy, practice, or
legislative changes relating to ... choice of law or jurisdiction for
resolution of trademark rights disputes relating to domain names,
including which jurisdictions should be available for trademark
rights owners to file suit to protect such trademarks rights." '314
The President and Congress have recognized one facet of the
problem facing intellectual property owners and have taken the first
step toward a solution.315 A more effective potential solution to
the problem is an amendment to Section 39 of the Lanham Act
authorizing nationwide jurisdiction in unfair competition, dilution,
false advertising and infringement controversies arising from
electronic contacts on the Internet.
312 Registration of Trade-Marks: Joint Hearings on S. 2679 Before the
Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong. 77 (1925).
313 Next Generation Internet Research Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-305,
112 Stat. 2919.
314 Id. This issue is being explored in other arenas. The American Bar
Association, in conjunction with Chicago-Kent College of Law of the Illinois
Institute of Technology, are teamed "to map jurisdictional guidelines for
electronic commerce." Chair's Bulletin: Section Happenings, A.B.A. SEC. OF
INTELL. PRoP. L., Oct. 1998, at 3.
315 Prior Senate versions of this bill included the language, "for trademark
and intellectual property rights owners to file suit to protect such trademarks and
intellectual property rights." S. 1609, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1727, 105th Cong.
(1998). The version that eventually passed was H.R. 3332, 105th Cong. (1998).
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V. A STATUTORY SOLUTION
There have been various solutions proposed to the problems
presented in trademark law by the Internet.316 The proposed
solutions, however, currently center around fixing territorial
boundaries to a boundless medium.317 They fail to focus on the
personal jurisdiction issues that arise and will continue to arise.
Even if arbitration is an answer to the problem, as commentators
suggest and Congress is investigating, the issue of jurisdiction will
be the initial hurdle to surmount.318 It is proposed therefore, that
316 See, e.g., Eric Schneiderman & Ronald Kornreich, Personal Jurisdiction
and Internet Commerce, N.Y.L.J., June 4, 1997, at 1 (suggesting the development
of a hierarchy based on the number of hits a Web site receives to determine its
degree of interactivity). One trademark holder recently took a different route to
avoid the problems inherent in acquiring personal jurisdiction in Internet cases.
Porsche Cars, on January 6, 1999, filed an in rem proceeding in the Eastern
District Court of Virginia against 166 domain names that contain its trademark
"Porsche." Porsche complaint (visited Mar. 19, 1999) <http://www.mama-
tech.com/pc.html>. Porsche filed the complaint in Virginia because NSI is based
there. Wendy Liebowitz, Courts Struggling With Cyberspace Jurisdiction,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1999, at 5. Trademark holders and litigators are watching the
litigation to see whether Porsche will be successful in invoking in rem
jurisdiction. Id.
317 See, e.g., Jonathan E. Moskin, New Proposals to Manage Internet Names
and Addresses, INTERNET NEWSL.: LEGAL & Bus. ASPECTS, June 1998, at 3
(suggesting that a third-level domain designating regional use, such as ".ny"
(New York) in conjunction with the use of the 241 separate national top-level
domains which include ".us" (United States), ".de" (Germany) and ".ne"
(Netherlands) would allow domain names and trademarks to exist in harmony).
It is significant to note, however, that parties have chosen to embroil themselves
in domain name disputes to acquire the ".com" when they have already
registered the ".org." See No Mayo-San Francisco v. Memminger, No. C-98-
1392 PJH, 1998 WL 544974, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1998); Avery Dennison
Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
318 See Next Generation Internet Research Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-305,
112 Stat. 2919; Perritt, supra note 265, at 188 (espousing arbitration before a
"Virtual Magistrate"); WIPO REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 3, 107-201 (proposing
the use of mediation and arbitration with consent to jurisdiction of particular
courts in particular countries, but also suggesting that such procedures not be
made mandatory or preclude access to court litigation).
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an amendment to section 39 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1121,
would clarify personal jurisdiction in controversies arising from the
Internet.
A. A Parsing of the Proposed Statute
A statute would serve the policy of trademark law by providing
national uniformity and consistency in application. The proposed
statute, as set forth in Appendix A, provides for nationwide
jurisdiction and service of process in actions brought in a federal
district court of the United States for the enforcement of any right
created by sections 32319 and 43320 or to enjoin .any violation of
the Lanham Act pursuant to section 34.321 This statute may be
utilized only in those instances where the action or violation
complained of arises out of electronic use of a mark or trade name
on the Internet.
For the purposes of this statute, the "Internet" is defined in 47
U.S.C § 230(e)(1). This section provides that "[t]he term 'Internet'
means the international computer network of both Federal and non-
Federal interoperable packet switched data networks." The
proposed statute is explicitly applicable to visible electronic use of
a mark or trade name as in domain name disputes, hyperlinks,
framing and keyword triggering.322 The statute also expressly
applies to invisible electronic use on the Internet in embedded code
as utilized in metatags.2 3 Further, the statute is intended as a
blanket provision to cover other electronic uses on the Internet not
yet developed, contemplated or foreseen by the use of the language
"or otherwise functions electronically."
3'9 Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) (providing remedies for
infringement of a registered mark used in commerce).
320 Lanham Act § 42, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (providing
remedies for false designations of origin, false descriptions and dilution of a
mark used in commerce).
321 Lanham Act § 34, 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (vesting
the court with the power to issue an injunction to prevent the violation of the
rights of an owner of a mark).
322 See supra notes 4, 6-8 (discussing domain names, hyperlinks, framing
and keyword triggering).
323 See supra note 5 (discussing metatags).
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The proposed statute is modeled on existing federal statutes
that provide for nationwide jurisdiction and service of process.324
The statute provides that the action may be brought in the district
where the harm occurred, where the defendant resides, transacts
business or may be found. Service of process may be served where
the defendant resides or may be found.
B. The Benefits and Arguable Disadvantages of the
Proposed Statute
Opponents may charge that violations of the Lanham Act may
be pursued in either federal or state court and a statute, such as the
one proposed, would serve to encourage litigation in the overbur-
dened federal courts. This argument is without merit because it is
unlikely that the federal case load would see a sharp increase as
most Lanham Act violations are already pursued in federal
court.3 25 In theory, federal court judges have an expertise in this
area of the law and are therefore better equipped to handle such
cases.3 26 Moreover, the federal court's injunctive reach exceeds
that of state courts and as such could arguably have encouraged
federal litigation since its enactment in 1946.327
Opponents may also charge that the statute would result in
unfairness to defendants because small businesses could be forced
to litigate in distant forums. The inescapable reality is that courts
across the United States routinely find that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion with this result is fair. The courts, when analyzing the
appropriateness of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, must determine whether this comports with "fair play
",328
and substantial justice. In reaching these decisions, courts
consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum and
324 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1994);
Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994); ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(e)(2) (1994).
32' 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 32:1, at 32-8.
326 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 32:1, at 32-9.
327 Lanham Act § 34, 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997).
328 See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S 102, 113 (1987). See
also supra note 91 (discussing the Asahi decision).
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the plaintiff.329 The interests of both the forum and the plaintiff
can easily be established.
In analyzing the burden on the defendant, courts typically point
to the advancements that make travel across the United States
convenient when finding that the exercise of jurisdiction is not
constitutionally unreasonable.330 Increasingly, courts in Internet
cases turn the defendants' use of the Internet into a sword against
them. For example, in Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., the
defendant's Web site stated that it would "provide services to any
customer site., 331 The court found that the burden on the defen-
dant was not unfair because he was "able and willing to travel, as
evidenced by [his] self-proclaimed frequent and extensive business
travel. 332
Similarly, jurisdiction was found to be fair in American
Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., where the
defendant's Web site advertised that it could help customers
"across the U.S. ' 3 33 In Haelan Products Inc. v. Beso Biological
Research, Inc., the court found that jurisdiction was fair because
the defendant used the modern technology of the Internet "to
continuously solicit business nationwide. 334 In Gary Scott
International, Inc. v. Baroudi, the court found jurisdiction to be fair
because the defendant was a business man who marketed his
product nationwide through the Internet.335
In Digital Equipment Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc., the
court opined that the burden of appearing "may well be the price
of ... agreeing to do business involving the Internet. '336 By
enacting a statute providing for jurisdiction in these cases the
defendants are at least given fair warning that their Internet activity
will subject them to the jurisdiction of federal courts nationwide.
329 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
330 See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir.
1998).
331 994 F. Supp. 34, 44 (D. Mass. 1997).
332 Id. at 45.
311 975 F. Supp. 494, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
334 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1672, 1676 (E.D. La. 1997).
"1 981 F. Supp. 714, 717 (D. Mass. 1997).
336 960 F. Supp. 456, 471 (D. Mass. 1997).
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Opponents may further charge that a statute of this type could
potentially open the floodgates to jurisdiction in other tort cases.
This argument too is without merit. Trademark violations, while
held by the courts to be torts, have been repeatedly found to be
more closely related to the intentional tort of libel, because the tort
of libel is held to occur where the offending material is circulat-
ed.337 Similarly, in trademark infringement cases, courts have
held that the claim arises where the "passing off' occurs-where
the deceived customer purchases the defendant's goods in the
mistaken belief that he is purchasing goods from the plaintiff or
where the plaintiff suffers economic impact.338 In Indianapolis
Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club, L.P.,33 9 the
court used an oversimplified version of the "effects test" set forth
in the Calder v. Jones340 libel case. In Indianapolis Colts, the
defendant's entry into the forum consisted only of a planned
nationwide television broadcast of its games. 341' This jurisdictional
test has been repeatedly applied in trademark controversies as such
controversies are analogous to intentional torts. 34 2
Opponents may challenge the extremeness of the statute. To
serve the purpose of the statute, which is to eliminate personal
jurisdiction controversies in Internet trademark actions, the statute
can only be at one extreme or the other. The statute may either
provide that jurisdiction can not be exercised in these cases based
on a Web site or can provide for jurisdiction in all cases arising
from the use of a mark on the Internet. A middle ground provides
flexibility. Flexibility provides the basis for litigation furthering
inequality and inconsistency, as courts have taken divergent views
3" 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 32:38, at 32-48. See, e.g., Indianapolis
Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club, L.P., 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir.
1994).
338 See Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1956)
(where passing off occurs); Dakota Indus. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d
1384 (8th Cir. 1991) (where economic impact felt).
339 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994).
340 465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984). See supra note 92 (discussing "effects" test).
34' Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 411.
342 See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.
1998); Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 460 n.6
(D. Mass. 1997); Dakota Indus., 946 F.2d at 1391.
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on what constitutes additional contacts or is required beyond a
passive Web site to satisfy jurisdiction.
Consistency, fair warning, conservation of judicial resources,
speedy resolution, clarity, uniformity and faithfulness to the policy
of the Lanham Act are the goals of this proposed statute. In 1945,
the International Shoe Court relaxed jurisdictional standards to
keep pace with a progressively mobile society. 14 It is unlikely
that the Supreme Court could have imagined that the jurisdictional
test they fashioned in a case involving shoes could be appropriately
applied more than half a century later to a medium that defies
analogy. Congress must again meet the challenge of the courts, as
it has repeatedly done in the past, and enact a statute providing for
nationwide jurisdiction in trademark disputes derived from Internet
use.
CONCLUSION
The Internet has been a boon to business and the economy.
Conversely, the Internet has presented our courts with complex
problems, taxing their resources. The policy of the Lanham Act of
uniformity, speedy resolution, clarity and consistency is being
undermined by the courts. The personal jurisdiction decisions
rendered by the courts, in trademark controversies arising from
electronic contacts on the Internet, cannot be reconciled.
The inconsistency of application of traditional personal
jurisdiction analysis, arguably violates due process as the decisions
lack clarity and fail to give defendants "fair warning." Further, the
decisions illustrate the inappropriateness of applying traditional
personal jurisdiction doctrines which derived from tangible physical
contacts to a borderless electronic medium. Congress must solve
this dilemma by amending section 39 of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1121, to provide for nationwide jurisdiction in trademark
controversies derived from electronic contacts on the Internet.
343 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction was proper over a defendant who although not present in the forum
had "certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" was
proper). See FREIDENTHAL, supra note 95, § 3.10, at 120.
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The speed of innovations in technology in this country require
a break with the accepted tradition that the law always lags behind
technological advances and requires instead that the law be, if not
ahead of technology, then at least in pace with it.
APPENDIX:
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994)*
§ 1121. Jurisdiction of Federal courts; Nationwide service of
process in controversies arising from electronic use on the
Internet; State and local requirements that registered
trademarks be altered or displayed differently; prohibition
(a) The district and territorial courts of the United States shall
have original jurisdiction and the courts of appeal of the United
States (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) shall have appellate jurisdiction, of all actions
arising under this chapter, without regard to the amount in
controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity of the citizenship of
the parties.
(1) Any suit or action, brought in a district court of
the United States, to enforce any right created by sections 1114
and 1125 of this title or to enjoin any violation of this title
pursuant to section 1116, where a mark or trade name is electroni-
cally visible, or electronically embedded in code, or otherwise
functions on the Internet as it is defined in section 230(e)(1) of title
47, and the claim arises from the electronic use on the Internet of
such mark or trade name, may be brought in the district of the
situs of the harm or in the district where the defendant is found or
is a resident or transacts business or wherever the defendant may
be found, and process in such cases may be served in any other
district of which the defendant is a resident or wherever the
defendant may be found.
* Proposed revisions are denoted by italics.
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(b) No State or other jurisdiction of the United States or any
political subdivision or any agency thereof may require alteration
of a registered mark, or require that additional trademarks, service
marks, trade names or corporate names that may be associated with
or incorporated into the registered mark be displayed in the mark
in a manner differing from the display of such additional trade-
marks, service marks, trade names, or corporate names contemplat-
ed by the registered mark as exhibited in the certificate of registra-
tion issued by the Unites States Patent and Trademark Office.
